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Product Simulation in
The Eighth Circuit
I. INTRODUCTION
Product simulation law is not a recent development.' Decisions
dating from 1964,2 however, have not brought order to the area.
Much of the uncertainty in product simulation law rests on two
broad policy issues inadequately addressed by the courts: Is prod-
uct simulation law advanced by statutory and judicial uncertainty?
Is the public interest in competition advanced by freedom to copy
or is it advanced by protection of an investor's interest in his crea-
tion. The second issue follows directly from the first because the
state of simulation law has been influenced directly by each individ-
ual court's view of competition. 3
A recent trend has developed where courts concentrate solely
on the end developments without addressing the overriding policy
issues.4  Frequently, even the end developments are not analyzed
1. See Clineburg, Protection Afforded by the Law of Copyright to Re-
cording Artists in Their Interpretation of Musical Compositions, 20
NEB. L. Rlv. 79, 86 (1941); Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.,
7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). For a defini-
tion of product simulation as used in this comment, see notes 141-
43 and accompanying text infra.
2. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3. This is amply illustrated by the strong free competition views long
and vigorously advocated in the Second Circuit by Judge Learned
Hand. The stage for erosion of his views was set in 1938 with Erie
R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Judge Hand's view of New
York law in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940), was effectively overruled by the state
court decisions in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Re-
corder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd,
279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). Judge Hand's views, for-
merly a majority position, were relegated to a dissenting opinion in
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955).
4. See Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest: Secon-
dary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. Rv.
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fully.5 This results in poorly-reasoned cases of little value to either
business or the bar.
This comment will review the broad issues of competition and
decisional certainty and trace their evolvement into the doctrine
of unfair competition as applied to product simulation cases.
Finally, a recent eighth circuit product simulation case and the dis-
trict court's unreported decision will be reviewed in light of these
issues of product simulation law.
Not analyzed here are anti-trust issues, which represent a
counter-weight to statutory and common law exemptions from
relief for intentional competitive injury.6
II. COMPETITION AND A "RIGHT" TO COPY
Although the first known English trademark case was decided
in 1618,7 grants from the crown similar to patents existed earlier.
8
935, 942 (1962) ("[T]he decisions are often shrouded in unhelpful con-
clusions phrased in the legal mysticism of 'secondary meaning' on
the one hand or of 'property rights' on the other."). Among the rare
exceptions where the courts have examined the broader issues are:
Societe Comptior de L'Industrie Contonniere v. Alexander's Dept.
Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962); American Safety Table Co.
v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd.,
137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943).
5. End developments include but are not limited to functionality, sec-
ondary meaning, passing off, and such statutory design protections
as design patent, copyright and trademark laws.
6. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 57 (1945) (Murphy,
J., dissenting: "[Before enjoining AP for antitrust violations] [t]here
should be clear proof here not only of a competitive advantage but
also of some unfair use of any competitive advantage that the Associ-
ated Press may possess .... "); E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGU-
LATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCEss 30 n.7 (1972) (federal anti-trust
laws may become "public policy" of a state on which plaintiff may
bring action for unfair competition); Handler, Product Simulation:
A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1178, 1187 (1964) (to elevate
the ethical standards of business, it cannot be forgotten that "unfair
competition is the other side of the anti-trust coin"-fraud must be
eliminated without preventing competition; competition preserved
without immunizing fraud). See also Ladas, Trademark Licensing
and the Antitrust Law, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 245 (1973).
7. Southern v. How, is of an uncertain date, however, probably decided
in the early 1600's. See Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59
TRADEMARK REP. 551, 571 n.57 (1969) for discussion of the case and
the problems caused by conflicting reports.
8. See note 11 infra.
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Eventually, the law of unfair competition, a separate branch of
product simulation law, evolved.9
The right to copy a competitor's goods was recognized in early
England,'0 but inventors jealously guarded their creations, causing
a loss to society of the knowledge and potential usefulness gained
from the discovery." Either to remedy this problem or to exact
personal or monetary tribute, the English crown began granting
"letters patent," which gave a monopoly to favored tradesmen.' -
Early grants encouraged the establishment of native producers by
placing a prohibition on imports.13 In the last half of the sixteenth
century, the crown began to grant "industrial monopoly licenses"
which, although also intended to establish new, strong national in-
dustries, resulted in abuse. rn the early 1600s, Parliament sought
to curb the abuses;' 4 the legislative activity culminated in the
passage of the Statute of Monopolies.' 5 Recognizing the abuses of
monopoly grants, the statute abolished monopolies, with certain ex-
ceptions.' 6 However, the statute allowed the crown to grant letters
patent for fourteen years or less to inventors of new processes.' 7
This statute has been regarded as the forerunner of our present
patent system.'8
9. See generally Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289
(1940).
10. See Arnold, A Philosophy on the Protection Afforded by Patent,
Trademark, Copyright and Unfair Competition Law: The Sources and
Nature of Product Simulation Law, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 413 (1964).
See also Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175, 175-77
(1936).
11. See Arnold, supra note 10. Perhaps the earliest patent law seeking
to remedy this problem was enacted by the city-state of Venice in
1474. A ten year grant to the inventor to restrict production by others
was allowed so that "[inventors] would exert their minds, invent and
make things which would be of no small utility to [Venice]." Id. at
415.
12. Id. at 416; see 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 344-
54 (1924).
13. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 344.
14. Id. at 347-48. This dissatisfaction was reflected in The Case of
Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602). Queen Elizabeth had
granted the plaintiff thea sole right to import playing cards. The de-
fendant sold cards in violation of this grant. The court unanimously
found the grant void because, among other reasons, "it is a monopoly,
and against the common law." Id. at 1262. See also Miller, The Case
of the Monopolies--Some of Its Results and Suggestions, 6 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (1907).
15. 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (abr.), reprinted in M.'HANDLER, TRADE REGULATION
848 (4th ed. 1967).
16. See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 353.
17. Id. at 354.
18. Id. at 354-55.
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Since the English common law right to copy a competitor's
product preceded patent grants, absent such a grant and its
monopoly privileges, it follows a fortiori that a right to copy re-
mains.1 9 Free competition is, after all, the underlying premise of
Anglo-American societies. 20
Similar development occurred in early American cases, which
generally allowed copying of unpatented articles.21 In Fairbanks
v. Jacobus,22 the defendant made molds of a Fairbanks' scale to cast
his own scale after Fairbanks' patent expired. 23 Although the de-
fendant's mold had even picked up the words "Fairbanks' Patent"
and other writing on the original scale,24 the court denied an injunc-
tion against copying the scale since the patents had expired; it
further found "Fairbanks' Patent" was not a trademark.25
In a similar case, Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing-Machine Co. v. The
Gibbons Frame,26 plaintiff's patent on its G-shaped sewing machine
frame expired. The defendant copied the frame which the plaintiff
had registered as a trademark.2 7  Plaintiff sought an injunction.
The court, however, denied relief, stating:
19. Cf. Note, Competition and the Law, 15 HARv. L. REv. 427, 429 (1902)
("[T]he law today [is]: competition is no tort-unless there be in-
vasion of a franchise.")
20. See 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 199 (1973).
21. Note, Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Effect of Sears and
Compco, 50 IowA L. REv. 836, 839 (1965).
22. 8 F. Cas. 951 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 4,608).
23. Id. at 952.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court noted:
Their patents, while they existed, (and those concerned
terminated in or about 1845,) protected them in the essential
structure of their invention, but exterior form, painted color,
and such non-essentials, were not, and could not be, the sub-
ject of the patents, and did not, and could not, secure these
to the plaintiffs. Much less could these be secured as a trade-
mark, for, a trade-mark is always something indicative of ori-
gin or ownership, by adoption and repute, and is something
different from the article itself which the mark designates.
An invention of structure a patent for the invention secures;
a design is secured by a patent for that. Apart from these,
any one may make anything in any form, and may copy with
exactness that which another has produced, without inflicting
any legal injury, unless he attributes to that which he has
made a false origin, by claiming it to be the manufacture
of another person. Any other doctrine is impossible to be
maintained; for, otherwise, all the colors, all the unessential
forms, could be monopolized as trade-marks, and exclusive
rights would be created, not limited in time, as patents are,
founded upon no public utility, and subject to no control but
the will of the adopter.
Id.
26. 17 F. 623 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
27. Id. at 624.
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All the effect which these frames have in representing ma-
chines to be those of the [plaintiff], appears to be due to the
monopoly enjoyed under the patents; and to give the [plaintiff]
the benefit of the effect by calling the frame a trade-mark, would
continue the monopoly indefinitely, when under the law it should
cease.
28
Other courts, however, granted relief for product simulation to
protect against consumer confusion or deception.29 The high point
of this trend occurred in 1918 with International News Service v.
Associated Press,30 when the Supreme Court prohibited Interna-
tional News Service from copying Associated Press' news bulletins.
Actually, the morality of the practice, and not consumer deception,
was the apparent basis of the holding.31
By the early 1900s, American case law generally allowed free
copying, but no copying if consumers would be confused as to source
and no copying if the practice appeared unethical to the court.
Injection of the consumer deception issue actually only served
to cloud the consideration of the real interests involved in product
simulation; the interest of the consumer in unfettered competition
in goods, and that of the producer in gaining a monopoly for his
product.32 As between these interests of consumer and producer,
28. Id. at 625. The plaintiff argued that the public identified the G-shape
with its company. This appears to be a forerunner 'of what today
is referred to as "secondary meaning." See section VI G infra.
29. Note, supra note 21, at 837. See, e.g., Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw
& Stamping Works, 163 F. 939 (2d Cir. 1908). It may be that the
Rushmore court decided, without so stating, that the Rushmore design
had in fact acquired secondary meaning, while the Wilcox court did
not believe the plaintiff's claims of consumer source identification of
the company, with the the G-shape frame.
30. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
31. Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrich-
ment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HAnv. L. REv. 595, 596
(1942) ("[International News Service] apparently foreshadowed rapid
development by the courts of a new body of equitable principles which
would belatedly require business practice to measure up to minimum
standards of public morality.")
32. One study noted:
An important factor in determining the boundaries of the mar-
ket is the knowledge of buyers as to the alternatives open
to them. If other conditions are equal, it would seem for
this reason to follow that the more homogeneous the product
of rival sellers, the more easily buyers could switch from the
output of one competitor to that of others; and therefore the
wider the market and the greater the degree of competition
in it.
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, Economic Indicia of Competition and Monopoly 317-
39 (1955), reprinted in part in M. HANDLER, supra note 15, at 67. Con-
96 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
the founding theorist of the free market concept noted: "Consump-
tion is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest
of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be
necessary for promoting that of the consumer. ' 3 Likewise Judge
Frank, in a review of the laissez-faire theory and resulting juris-
prudence, noted: "[W] here the economic interest of consumers con-
flicted with the economic interest of the competitor, only the
consumer interest was judicially considered. 83 4
This free competition economic concept has been viewed as a
legal concept and embodied in the Restatement of Torts,3 5 along
with recognition that free competition to benefit the public as a
whole results in harm to individual producers. 36
Other authors, however, have favored protecting the individual
producer 37 or have advocated basing decisions on morality or other
subjective standards.38  Still others have ignored the common law
favoring competition and sought a different standard based on stat-
utes.
39
tra, Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MIcH. L.
REv. 967 (1952) (competition requires differentiation).
33. 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 660 (Glasgow ed. 1976).
34. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1945)
(Frank, J., concurring).
35. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 708, Comment c (1938).
36. Id. Comment d. Cf. Note, supra note 19, at 445:
How, then, can competition be a justification, even when it
is fair? There can be but one ground for that justification-
public policy. That competition in the general case and by
the usual methods should be free is the economic ideal of our
time. Free competition is held worth more to society than
it costs.
37. Cf. Callmann, supra note 31, at 599: ("To justify any regulation of
competition, it need not be shown that it is positively advantageous
to the public, but only that the public is not harmed thereby.").
38. Derenberg, The Eighteenth Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 609, 688 (1965). Rogers,
Unfair Competition, 17 MIcH. L. REv. 490, 494 (1919): "The Supreme
Court, in [International News Service], keeps pace with the modern
conditions and protects the honest trader from unfair interference with
his business .... The defendant's conduct was parasitic and immoral.
Immoral conduct is usually unfair to some one." Similarly, a more
contemporary author called for "a revival rather than the complete
extinction of principles of 'old fashioned commercial honesty' and fair
dealing." But see Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271
F.2d 569, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960) ("Dis-
taste for sharp or unethical business practices has often caused the
courts to lose sight of the fundamental consideration in the law of
unfair competition-protection of the public.").
39. Compare Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256
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It is said that the common law policy of free competition does
in fact promote efficiency and the general welfare.40  As adopted
by the Restatement of Torts, this policy recognized a privilege to
compete, tempered only by qualifications which balance the public
benefits from free competition with the private producer's desire
for protection of his inventions. 41 Whenever a court injects ques-
tions of morality or business ethics into its decision, these qualifi-
cations and the balancing they require are ignored. Then, too, is
ignored the real issue:
Whenever copying is prohibited, the scope of competition in the
production and marketing of the copied product is likewise reduced,
thereby compromising to some degree the basic free enterprise
premise "that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress." 42
III. THE MERITS OF CERTAINTY
As in other areas, the law of product simulation is composed
both of rules evoking certainty and decisions evoking uncertainty;
the result is problem resolution on a case by case basis.43 Courts
rely on the past, yet are able through reasoned elaboration by ex-
ample to keep the law sufficiently flexible to allow change.44 The
objective of this reasoning process is not to relate the present to
the past but instead to give authoritative direction to the private
(1945), and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122
(1938), with Arnold, supra note 10, at 428 ("[T]he idea of the patent
law or the copyright law having something to do with an affirmative
right to copy, is erroneously fabricated out of whole cloth by the
Courts."). Another author indicated since the right to copy was a
common law concept, it was "an undelegated right remaining in the
states." Chapman, The Supreme Court and Federal Law of Unfair
Competition, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 573, 579 (1964). Still another author
would limit the right to copy a competitor's goods to instances where
commercial necessity made copying necessary. Galbally, Unfair Trade
in the Simulation of Rival Goods-The Test of Commercial Necessity,
3 VILL. L. REv. 333 (1958).
40. See R. POSNER, ECONoMc ANALYSIs OF LAW §§ 5.1-.2 (1972).
41. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 711-756 at 538 (1938).
The qualifications appear to be based on the idea that "an ungentle-
manly practice will be condemned so long as its condemnation will
not injure the consuming public more than the ungentlemanly practice
itself." Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (2d Cir.
1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941).
42. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 970 (quoting from Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
43. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHm L. REv. 501, 503
(1948).
44. Id.
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ordering of future conduct.45 This objective necessitates speaking
in generalities so as to avoid unwise or unnecessary restriction on
future conduct.46
A balance must be struck between rigidity which stymies the
growth of the law and ambiguities which result in case by case
decision-making with no guidance for future actions. A reasonable
adherence to prior decisions facilitates a private ordering by which
both the bar and individuals hope to minimize litigation.47
Unfortunately, differences of opinion on the right to copy are
reflected in the court decisions. 48 While consistent analysis of the
competing interests of consumer and producer would aid in deciding
the individual case and provide guidance, such consistency is not
easy.
The short answer to the problem is to take refuge in a case-by-
case analysis, by means of which the solution appropriate to each
peculiar set of facts is developed. This approach leaves unstated,
however, the standards for making the comparison-and therefore,
as some may view it, leaves too much room for individual caprice
and too much uncertainty for the businessmen affected. 49
45. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 128 (tent. ed. 1958). See also Hart,
The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 490 (1954).
46. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 45, at 129.
47. Id. at 587-88; Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 960 ("Refusal to
face the problems of balancing the competing policies and values at
stake ... amounts to abdication of the judicial function.").
48. Pollack, Unfair Trading by Product Simulation: Rule or Rankle?, 23
OHIO ST. L.J. 74, 74 (1962) ("Since these opinions of the judiciary
[on unfair competition] have reflected, in turn, philosophies of busi-
ness management and protection of public interest, they have been,
at times, both contradictory and confusing.").
49. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 959 (footnotes omitted). Adverse
business effects result from application of the misappropriation doc-
trine.
To the extent that law should serve a predictive function,
a law of unfair competition based on case-by-case determina-
tion of whether there has been misappropriation fails abys-
mally in its task. The effect of this juridical risk on the small
businessman who cannot afford to make blind guesses which
may cause the destruction of his business is manifest; the re-
sult of the misappropriation doctrine may well be the discour-
agement of even such copying as might ultimately be held
legitimate under the most ambitious misappropriation theory.
Moreover, the "convenient vagueness" of the misappropriation
doctrine is objectionable on more general grounds. Basically,
what defenders of the vagueness theory of unfair competition
law contemplate is a carte blanche to the courts to write their
own code of business morality.
Id. at 969 (footnotes omitted). See also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
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While some uncertainty will always be present where the law
is dynamic, opinions arrived at by a reasoning process which consid-
ers the underlying policies favoring competitor and provides future
direction would improve the present state of the law. Uncertainty
itself stifles competition.
IV. SEARS AND COMPCO
As indicated above, limitations to the common law right to copy
developed over the years, taking the forms of patent and copyright
law, which established a property right in derogation of the com-
mon law,50 and trademark law, a protection against "passing off." 51
Subject to these limitations, the Supreme Court had long recog-
nized the right to imitate or copy,52 with the notable exception of
International News Service v. Associated Press '53 in which the Court
adopted the misappropriation doctrine. 54 However, many courts re-
Top Co., 365 U.S. 336, 358 (1960) (in a concurring opinion, Justice
Black attacked ambiguous court opinions which "would subject small
businessmen to the devastating uncertainties of nebulous and per-
missive standards of infringement under which courts could impose
treble damages upon them."). Accord, Kessler & Stern, Competition,
Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 66-67 n.295 (1959)
("[C]ase-by-case analysis [in antitrust cases], pushed far enough, is
no analysis at all."). Contra, Kunin, The Lindsay Bill Before and
After the Stiffel Case, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 731, 749 (1964) ("[T]he
distinction between "functional" and "nonfunctional" features . . . is
best made via a case by case . . . approach rather than by means
of a doctrinaire definition."); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation
in Unfair Competition: The Associated Press Doctrine After Forty
Years, 11 VAND. L. REv. 483, 497 (1958) ("It may be seriously ques-
tioned whether there need be such clarity or definiteness in the unfair
competition cases.").
50. Note, Trademark Protection of Objects and Configurations: A Critical
Analysis, 59 Iv.nhN. L. REv. 541, 554 (1975).
51. 46 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 164, 169 (1971).
52. See Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
53. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
54. See text accompanying note 314 infra for definition of the misappropri-
ation doctrine. Although the misappropriation doctrine was foreshad-
owed by Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909),
overruled in part in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d
Cir. 1952), International News Service is generally regarded as the
source of the doctrine. See 2 H. NiMs, THE LAW OF UNrFAnR CoMPEri-
TION AND TRADE-ARMS, 924-25 (4th ed. 1947). However, use of the
misappropriation doctrine to grant Associated Press relief may have
been inappropriate. AP's bylaws not only prohibited AP members
from selling dispatches to non-members, but also gave the members
veto power over newspapers applying for membership, especially if
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fused to apply the International News Service doctrine, fearing its
application would restrict competition and lead to monopolistic
the applicant had already competed with a member. As a result,
entry into the association was severely restricted. These restrictions
were struck down as violating both the antitrust laws and the broad
public interest in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The lower court opinion
was rendered by a court composed of Circuit Judges Learned Hand,
Swan, and Augustus Hand, sitting as a three judge district court pur-
suant to 15 U.S.C. § 28. The court, in an opinion by Judge Learned
Hand, granted the government's motion for summary judgment and
enjoined further enforcement of the AP bylaws that restricted mem-
bership and the sale of dispatches by members to non-members.
Judge Swan dissented on the grounds that news gathering was not
regarded at common law as affected with a public interest and there-
fore was not susceptible to antitrust regulation. Judge Swan further
stated that the antitrust laws did not justify imposing on AP a duty
to serve without discrimination all newspaper applicants, nor a finding
that AP had a monopoly in newsgathering.
On appeal, the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Black af-
firmed the lower court. The opinion reviewed the bylaws as well
as Inter-Ocean Publishing Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56 N.E.
822 (1900), which held that AP's operations constituted a restraint
on trade.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas sought to limit the decision
"in view of the broader issues which have been injected." 326 U.S.
at 23. Justice Douglas noted that, consistent with Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), only unreasonable restraints of
trade violated the Sherman Act. In his view the exclusive arrange-
ments employed by AP through its bylaws were part of a mechanism
which effectively restrained trade in violation of the Act. Justice
Douglas indicated, however, that since the district court had found
no monopoly, the public utility theory was not applicable. Concur-
ring, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the public interest discussed by
Judge Learned Hand in the lower court opinion, and impliedly
adopted the public utility theory. Justice Roberts, in a lengthy dissent
joined by Chief Justice Stone, found no violation of the Sherman Act,
found sufficient competition with AP to insure dissemination of news,
and finally attacked the majority as making "AP a public utility sub-
ject to the duty to serve all on equal terms," under the guise of the
Sherman Act. 326 U.S. at 45-46 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justice
Murphy also dissented, on the ground that the case was inappropriate
for summary judgment.
The above litigation could have been avoided if the Court in Inter-
national News Service had concentrated not on International News
Services' practices but rather on the reason INS was forced to resort
to those practices. Although the high cost of establishing a competing
world-wide newsgathering organization may have caused Interna-
tional News Service to pirate AP's dispatches, there is evidence that
INS was banned from distributing news from certain foreign countries
because it refused to adhere to the official line. See E. KiTCH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 24 n.1. A suggested solution would have
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practices.55 Judge Wyzanski later speculated that the Supreme
Court would overrule International News Service if again presented
with the question.5 6
The Supreme Court later shifted its position to favor competi-
tion and the right to copy unpatented products in Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co." However, after Kellogg, a trend developed
restricting product imitation based upon either the misappropria-
tion doctrine or judicial concepts of commercial morality. s And,
in 1962 and 1963, two seventh circuit decisions5 9 disregarded con-
sumers' interest in free competition and granted relief based solely
on producers' interests.60 Purportedly based on state law, the de-
cisions actually represented a departure from state law.61 Some
regarded the decisions as trespassing on the congressional balance,
struck in the patent acts, between competition and the producer's
interests. 62 The stage set, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.63 and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.6 4
Stiffel Company had first marketed its pole lamp in 1956. Both
a patent and design patent were issued on it in 1957.65 Sears ad-
vertised a similar lamp in its 1957 catalogue 66 with Sears' retail
price roughly the same as Stiffel's wholesale price. 67  Stiffel
been for the Court to require AP to license INS at reasonable royalty
rates. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319
(1947); M. HANDLEH, supra note 15, at 944. Needless litigation could
have been'avoided. If International News Service had objected to
payment of the royalty, it still could have gone abroad and developed
its own organization.
55. See Sell, supra note 49, at 494. See also Chafee, supra note 9, at
1311-15.
56. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,
46 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Mass. 1942).
57. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
58. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 941, 969; Note, supra note 50,
at 553; Comment, Product Appearance in the Law of Unfair Competi-
tion-Preemption or Protection?, 73 YALE L.J. 389, 394 (1963).
59. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313
F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
60. See Note, supra note 21, at 847.
61. Marks, Copying an Article of Commerce not Necessarily Unfair Com-
petition, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 47, 48 (1965).
62. See generally Comment, supra note 58.
63. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
64. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
65. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d at 116.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 118.
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brought an action against Sears in federal court for patent infringe-
ment and unfair competition. Although the court held both of Stif-
fe's patents invalid, it found Sears guilty of unfair competition.68
The evidence, as reviewed by the court of appeals in sustaining the
unfair competition charge, indicated: (1) Stiffel's lamp was a huge
success; (2) Sears sought to capitalize on this success; (3) Sears'
lamp was "a substantially exact copy;" and (4) Sears' lamp was
not labeled (although the package the lamp came in was labeled).69
The court also looked disfavorably at the price difference and found
"a likelihood of confusion and some actual confusion," which the
appellate court construed as meaning confusion "as to the source of
the lamps."70 The appellate court said that Stiffel, to succeed, was
not required by Illinois law to show either palming off or secondary
meaning.71 The issue before the Supreme Court, as stated in Justice
Black's opinion, was whether a state's unfair competition law could,
consistent with federal patent laws, prohibit or impose liability for
the copying of an article which was protected by neither a federal
patent nor a copyright. 72 The answer, according to the Court, was
no, based on the fear that the state law would grant a monopoly
greater than that allowed by tei federal patent or copyright laws.73
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp. involved a similar set
of facts.7 4 Day-Brite manufactured fluorescent lighting fixtures and
in 1955 obtained a design patent on the reflector used in the
fixture.75  In 1955, Compco's predecessors manufactured fixtures
with reflectors almost identical to the Day-Bright design.70 Day-
Brite sued for patent infringement and for unfair competition.77
68. Id. at 118. Certiorari was granted only on the unfair competition is-
sue. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 227. No review
of the patent ruling was sought. Id. at 227 n.1.
69. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d at 118.
70. Id. at 118.
71. Id.
72. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 225.
73. Id. at 233. Judge Learned Hand's opinion in G. Ricoridi & Co. v.
Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1952), was used as support for
the proposition. Judge Hand reaffirmed in Haendler the Second Cir-
cuit's limitation of International News Service to its facts and over-
ruled conflicting parts of Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909), which was a forerunner to International News
Service's application of the misappropriation doctrine. See note 54
supra.
74. 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Compco was
decided by the Seventh Circuit prior to Sears. It was cited by the
Sears court for certain conclusions in its opinion.
75. 311 F.2d at 28.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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In the district court, the design patent was held invalid, since the
reflector design was found to be "functional."7 8 Compco, however,
was found liable for unfair competition.79
Functionality of design was not addressed by the court of
appeals in deciding the unfair competition issue, and the court
noted:
While the District Judge did not specifically find "secondary mean-
ing" identifying the reflectors with the plaintiff as a source, he did
find that the appearance [of the reflector] has the capacity to iden-
tify the plaintiff in the trade and does, in fact, so identify the plain-
tiff to the trade.8 0
In defense, Compco argued confusion was impossible due to the
expense of the product, the use of marked containers and the skill
and experience of the discerning purchasers.81 In addition, Compco
argued, absent a finding of secondary meaning or palming off, un-
fair competition could not lie.
82
Although Justice Black implied that the Court could have
reversed on clear error in the lower courts' findings,8 3 the Court
based its decision on federal preemption of a state law prohibiting
the free copying of unpatented or uncopyrighted articles.8 4
Both Sears and Compco were cast in broad and unclear language
of federal preemption.8 5 The broad terms may have been a deliber-
ate blow to a trend of state and federal courts' adoption of the mis-
appropriation doctrine and preference for private producers' rights
over those of the general public.8 6
Because of the lack of clarity, Sears and Compco were viewed
variously: International News Service was overruled by implica-
tion;8 7 the misappropriation doctrine no longer applied to product
78. Id. That issue was not before the United States Supreme Court.
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. at 236 n.2.
79. 311 F.2d at 29.
80. Id. at 29. Justice Black did not make any distinction as to confusion
in the trade. 376 U.S. at 235. However, one author finds this type
of confusion legally insignificant. Treece, Patent Policy and Preemp-
tion: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. Cmi. L. Ruv. 80, 80 n.6
(1964).
81. 311 F.2d at 29.
82. Id.
83. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. at 237.
84. Id.
85. Cf. 8 U.S.F.L. REv. supra. note 20, at 203 (language indicating federal
statutory preemption is dictum).
86. See Treece, supra note 80, at 90; The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78
HARV. L. REv. 143, 311 (1964); Note, supra note 21, at 852.
87. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967).
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simulation law;8 8 Sears and Compco did not prevent state applica-
tion of the misappropriation doctrine;8 9 Sears and Compco required
a return to traditional principles of unfair competition law; 90 state
trade secret law was preempted by federal law;91 statutory action
on the state level was necessary to protect against certain acts of
unfair competition; 92 and "revolutionary" changes in unfair compe-
tition law and possibly in antitrust law were perhaps in the mak-
ing.9 3
. The decisions especially created problems for trademark law.
Although the issue of obtaining a trademark in a product configura-
tion was not confronted in Compco, Justice Black's broad dicta
indicated labeling could be the primary remedy to prevent con-
sumer confusion or deception.
As we have said in Sears, while the federal patent laws
prevent a State from prohibiting copying and selling of unpatented
articles, they do not stand in the way of state law, statutory or
decisional, which requires those who make and sell copies to take
precautions to identify their products as their own. A State of
course has power to impose liability upon those who, knowing that
the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's reputation for
quality and integrity, deceive the public by palming off their copies
as the original. That an article copied from an unpatented article
could be made in some other way, that the design is "nonfunc-
tional" and not essential to the use of either article, that the con-
figuration of the article copied may have a "secondary meaning"
which identifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be "con-
fusion" among purchasers as to which article is which or as to who
is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's
law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, neither these
88. Note, supra note 21, at 854 n.116.
89. Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 781 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1964); New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc., 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 939, 942 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964),
aff'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1964).
90. Treece, supra note 80, at 96.
91. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
416 U.S. 470 (1974). See Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Pre-
Emption-The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y
713 (1967); Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by
Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HAEv. L. REv. 1432 (1967);
Comment, Factors to Focus On: Federal Patent Preemption of State
Trade Secret Law, 53 NEB. L. REv. 226 (1974); Comment, The Stiffel
Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 956 (1968);
Note, Trade Secrets Law after Sears and Compco, 53 VA. L. REv. 356
(1967).
92. Lunsford, Trademarks: Dilution and Deception, 63 TRADEMARK Rm.
41 (1973); Lunsford, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: Need for
Uniform State Laws, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 77 (1968).
93. Handler, supra note 6, at 1184, 1190.
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facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for
or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling, regardless of
the copier's motives. 94
While both Sears and Compco dealt with the copying of configura-
tions unprotected by design patents, the opinions were not limited
to this area.
V. AFTER SEARS AND COMPCO
The Supreme Court first commented on Sears and Compco in
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.95 Lear employed Adkins to solve certain
aviation gyroscope problems.9 6 Pursuant to an employment licens-
ing agreement, Lear was to pay Adkins royalties on his discoveries
in return for his disclosure of those discoveries to Lear.9 7 A clause
in the agreement provided that if no patent were issued on a dis-
covery, Lear could terminate the agreement.9 8 Adkins filed for a
patent in 1954, however, it was not granted until 1960.99 In the
interim, Lear decided that Adkins' invention was not patentable and
paid no further royalties. 10 After the patent issued, Adkins sued
Lear in the California Superior Court for breach of contract.1 1
Lear attempted to argue patent invalidity, but the California Su-
preme Court held Lear, as a licensee, was estopped to challenge the
validity of Adkins'patent.10 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider whether licensee estoppel, last discussed in Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,103 was still valid
"in light of our recent decisions [in Sears and Compco] em-
phasizing the strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection." 0 4 The Court over-
ruled Hazeltine.10 5 While construction of a licensing agreement is
94. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. at 238.
95. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Two intervening cases, Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
379 U.S. 29 (1964), and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), while not citing Sears or Compco, have like-
wise been regarded as expressing opposition to the misappropriation
doctrine. See Note, The Future of Record Piracy, 38 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 406, 414 n.51 (1971).
96. 395 U.S. at 655.
97. Id. at 657.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 658.
100. Id. at 659.
101. Id. at 660.
102. Id. at 661.
103. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
104. 395 U.S. at 656.
105. Id. at 671.
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solely a matter of state law, 06 the Court said, state enforcement
of the agreement would undermine the federal policy if the patent
was invalid.' 0 7 The Lear Court remanded the case for consideration
of the patent's validity. 0 8
Since the California Supreme Court had not found a trade
secret issue, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether federal
law preempted state trade secret protection. 0 9 The Lear opinion
did suggest the issue and noted it was "impossible to predict the
extent to which this re-evaluation [of trade secret law] may revolu-
tionalize the law."" 0 However, in a separate opinion, Justice
Black dissented on the trade secret issue."' He argued Sears and
Compco conclusively decided federal law does preempt state trade
secret law."
12
The next relevant application of Sears was in Deepworth Park-
ing Co. v. Laitram Corp. 13 Deepworth held, in a five to four
opinion, the unauthorized making of parts of an invention, protected
by a combination patent, within the United States for sale to
foreign buyers for assembly abroad did not violate the patent act
and did not constitute patent infringement. Sears was cited for
strict construction of patents under a federal policy against monop-
olies and for competition."
4
Thus, by 1972, no Supreme Court case had clearly defined the
parameters of Sears and Compco. Lower federal and state court
decisions generally took less than the broad view suggested by Jus-
tice Black in his partial dissent to Lear."5
Some clarification of Sears and Compco occurred in Goldstein
v. California."6 California, in response to the lack of federal sanc-
106. Id. at 661.
107. Id. at 674.
108. Id. at 674-75.
109. Id. at 675.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 676 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
112. Id. at 676-77. See Wydicke, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in
Light of Goldstein and Kewanee (pt. I), 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 736, 745
(1973).
113. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
114. Id. at 530-31.
115. Derenberg, supra note 38, at 680; Derenberg, The Twenty-fourth Year
of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 61 TRADE-
MARK REP. 257, 322 (1971) ("[T]here is also increasing justification
* . .to be optimistic with regard to limiting the effect of the Sears
and Compco decisions to certain specific areas of unfair competition.").
See also 8 U.S.F.L. REv. supra note 20, at 209.
116. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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tions for tape and record piracy, 117 had enacted section 653 (h) of
the California Penal Code, which made record piracy a criminal
117. Musical recordings have a long, tortured history under the copyright
laws. The first copyright statute passed in 1790 covered only maps,
charts and books; however, musical compositions and other items were
added through various amendments to the act between 1790 and 1909.
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1972) (summary).
Under the federal copyright law prior to 1909, musical compositions
were incapable of copyright registration and protection unless tran-
scribed upon paper in print or musical characters. White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). Based on this law, Apollo
held the reproduction of a composition onto player piano rolls was
not copyright infringement since the holes in the player piano roll
were neither print nor musical characters.
In 1909 Congress consolidated the federal copyright statutes and
addressed the Apollo holding by enacting § 101, which provided that
a recording infringed upon copyrighted sheet music and would there-
fore be subject to the compulsory license provisions of the Act. Act
of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (e) (1970)). See generally E. KrrcH & H. PERLMwA,
supra note 6, at 548. One court interpreted the 1909 act broadly, not-
ing: "[T]he copyright law has been amended, and since the 1st day
of July, 1909, any form of recording or transcribing a musical composi-
tion, or rendition of such composition, has been capable of registration,
and the property rights therein secured under the copyright statute
.... Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 963 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
Unfortunately, the Bradley view was not followed, and claims of
rights in mechanical recordings or the performance reproduced there-
by were not recognized under the Act. See Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 568 (1963); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d,657, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1955); Tape Indus. Ass'n of Amer-
ica v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed,
402 U.S. 902 (1971); 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1976).
In 1971 Congress amended the Copyright Act to include sound re-
cordings; however, the amendment did not relate back prior to Febru-
ary 15, 1972, the effective date of the amendment. Act of Oct. 15,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 2, 85 Stat. 392 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(e) (Supp. V 1975)). Because of this, an interesting parallel
exists between Goldstein and Bradley. In Bradley, the defendant pur-
chased one of plaintiff's records on the open market, made copies,
and sold the copies at half the price of the original. Since the act
occurred prior to the effective date of the 1909 Copyright Act, the
Bradley court could not grant relief under the Act even though it
did believe the Act provided sanctions for that problem. Goldstein
involved a similar operation and, since the acts occurred prior to the
effective date of the 1971 amendments, no remedies under the amended
Act were available.
The Bradley court noted: "[W]here the commercial value of the
imitation lies in the fact that it takes advantage of and appropriates
to itself the commercial qualities, reputation, and salable properties
of the original, equity should grant relief." -Fonotipia Ltd. v. Bradley,
171 F. at 964. Injunctive relief was granted. The significance of Brad-
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ley lies in the granting of relief for unfair competition absent a show-
ing of passing off. This foreshadowed the adoption of the misapprop-
riation doctrine in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918). See note 54 supra; 2 H. Nims, supra note 54, at
924-25.
The Goldstein holding dealt only with the constitutionality of the
California statute; however, the opinion also held that since Sears and
Compco were based on federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause, the misappropriation doctrine adopted in International News
Service was not overruled. See 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 199, 211 (1973).
The source of this tortured history is Congress. Courts were in
a difficult position because they had no statutory support to prevent
what they regarded as an unlawful taking. In Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1950), a
suit for copyright infringement of a musical composition, the court
noted, "The Copyright Act grants a monopoly only under limited con-
ditions. If plaintiff's argument is to succeed here, then a perpetual
monopoly is granted without the necessity of compliance with the
Copyright Act."
The problems caused by lack of uniform laws are illustrated by
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. R.A. Ridges Distrib. Co., 475 F.2d 262
(10th Cir. 1973), where the defendants, in acts predating the 1971 revi-
sion of the Copyright Act, pirated copies of plaintiff's tapes and rec-
ords in Utah. Plaintiff filed suit in state court for equitable relief
and obtained a preliminary injunction. Defendants removed the ac-
tion to federal district court where the state court injunction was dis-
solved and a motion to remand to state court denied. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the federal district court and ordered the case re-
manded to the state court because defendant's theory of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction based on Sears-Compco preemption was unfounded.
A case with nearly identical facts was before the Tenth Circuit a year
earlier in Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971).
Uniformity in either the copyright law or in court interpretations
would not only have saved extensive litigation, but would also have
provided both the infringers and the producers with certainty to guide
their actions. Cf. Bass, Interpretative Rights of Performing Artists,
42 DICK. L. REv. 57, 68 (1938) ("The chance of a uniform interpreta-
tion ... might have been better ... in the Federal court .... Leg-
islation is a more likely panacea-but who will assume to educate
forty-eight legislatures?"). Congress' failure from 1909 to 1971 to ad-
dress the problem of record piracy and its failure in 1971 to provide
a clear indication of what should happen to pre-1971 acts of record
piracy have forced courts to manipulate concepts of publication and
misappropriation to circumvent the inadequacies of the copyright act.
See Treece, supra note 80, at 88; Note, supra note 95, at 426; Comment,
Performers' Rights and Copyright: The Protection of Sound Record-
ings from Modern Pirates, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 548, 560 (1971); 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV., supra note 51, at 176; 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 199, 211 (1973). See also
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 45, at 541-46, 1394-1401 (discussion of
"the myth of an all-competent and indefatigable Congress" and "the
implication of the failure of Congress to act."). Congress has finally
passed a major copyright revision bill. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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offense.118 The defendants pleaded nolo contendere to ten of the
110 counts; the remainder were dismissed. After appeals in the
state courts, all of which sustained the validity of the statute, the
petitioners sought review in the United States Supreme Court.1!
The statute was attacked as unconstitutional since it: (1) estab-
lished a state copyright of unlimited duration, contrary to the copy-
right clause, (2) conflicted with federal policy expressed in statutes,
in violation of the supremacy clause, and (3) was not within the
common law copyright powers left to the states by the copyright
act.1
20
The Court analyzed these arguments and concluded the states,
under the Constitution, were not totally devoid of power to grant
rights in authors. Accordingly, the copyright clause's provision of
limited duration was found to apply only to Congress, and not to
the states.121 In regard to the supremacy clause, the Court deter-
mined Congress did not intend to remove recording from state con-
trol,1 22 and rejected the argument that Congress had so occupied
the copyright field as to preempt any state action.1 23 The Court
distinguished Sears and Compco:
In [Sears and Compco], the question was whether a State could,
under principles of a state unfair competition law, preclude the
copying of mechanical configurations which did not possess the
qualities required for the granting of a federal design patent or me-
chanical patent....
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress had balanced
the need to encourage invention and originality of invention against
the need to insure competition in the sale of identical or substanti-
ally identical products. The standards established for granting fed-
eral patent protection to machines thus indicated not only which
articles in this particular category Congress wished to protect, but
which configurations it wished to remain free. The application of
state law in these cases to prevent the copying of articles which
did not meet the requirements for federal protection disturbed the
careful balance which Congress had drawn and thereby necessar-
ily gave way under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. No
comparable conflict between state law and federal law arises in the
case of recording of musical performances.
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (h) (West 1970).
119. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546.
120. Id. at 551. The Sears-Compco opinions were unclear as to whether
preemption was based on the Constitution or federal statutes, thus
the "shotgun" approach was necessary in Goldstein. See, e.g., E.
KrrcH & H. PERLM", supra note 6, at 535-36 n.4.
121. 412 U.S. at 560-61.
122. Id. at 566.
123. Id. at 567-69.
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* [W]e have concluded that our decisions in Sears and
Compco, which we reaffirm today, have no application in the
present case .... 124
Goldstein thus appears to have limited Sears and Compco to
mechanical configurations, but clarified the bases of the decisions
as preemption under the supremacy clause. The dicta in Sears and
Compco as to the copyright law was ignored in the Goldstein
opinion. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, argued that the need for uniformity in both
patent and copyright law was recognized in the Constitution and
in Sears and Compco.125 Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion
also joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, said federal statutes
themselves preempted state regulation. 1 26
The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on Sears and Compco
was Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.1 27 A division of Kewanee
Oil Co. perfected, over a seventeen year period, a method for grow-
ing a synthetic crystal for use in detecting ionization radiation. 28
Some of the processes were considered trade secrets.129 Employees
left and formed or later joined Bicron Corporation which success-
fully grew a similar crystal in a nine month period.13 0 A diversity
action was brought in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio for damages and injunctive relief for ap-
propriation of trade secrets. 13' The district court granted an in-
junction against disclosure or use of some of the trade secrets; 13 "
however, the sixth circuit reversed the lower court, finding federal
patent law preempted state trade secret law. 33 The circuit court's
opinion was rendered a few weeks prior to Goldstein, and the
Supreme Court's limitations there were not available to the court
of appeals.
The Kewanee Court, again in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,
quickly disposed of copyright clause preemption. 134 The major issue
124. Id. at 569-71 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 572-75 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 576-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
128. Id. at 473.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 474. For the lower court opinion, see Bicron Corp. v. Kewanee
Oil Co., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See
also Wydick, supra note 112; Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemp-
tion in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee (pt. II), 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
4 (1974).
134. 416 U.S. at 478-79.
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issue was seen as the effect of the supremacy clause, and the Court
stated that "if the scheme of protection developed by Ohio respect-
ing trade secrets 'clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws,' Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. . . ., then the state law
must fall."135 The Court compared the purposes of trade secret
law with those of patent law and no such clash was found- "Each
has its own particular role to play, and the operation of one does
not take away from the need for the other.' 1 36 Justice Douglas dis-
sented, joined by Justice Brennan, on the grounds of conflict with
Sears and Compco.137
Although in Kewanee no preemption was found, Sears and
Compco were reaffirmed for the proposition that if state law con-
flicts with federal patent law, preemption occurs. 3 8 However, the
Court's opinion may not be substantially adverse to free competi-
tion, due to the inherently limited scope of trade secret law. 39
Thus by 1975, Sears and Compco had failed to revolutionize
patent, trade secret, trademark, copyright, or unfair competition
law as "the courts continue[d] to limit or avoid extension of the
Sears and Compco decisions into areas other than product simula-
tion." 40
VI. PRODUCT SIMULATION LAW: PROTECTION
OF PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS
This comment is directed toward the narrow situation in which
A copies the shape of B's product and markets the product to the
public as his own.' 41 This is referred to broadly as "product simula-
tion;" 42 however, the act of simulating, copying, or imitating will
not by itself be regarded as illegal. Illegality will follow only
if the shape is protected under the copyright, patent, or trade-
mark statutes, or if A so markets his product that an ordinary pur-
chaser believes he is in fact getting B's product. 1 43 "Simulation"
135. Id. at 480.
136. Id. at 493.
137. Id. at 495-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 480-81.
139. See generally Doerfer, supra note 91; Wydick, supra notes 112 & 133;
Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions
Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV. L. RPv. 807
(1974).
140. Walter J. Derenberg's The Twenty-eighth Year of Administration of
the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 65 TRADEMARx REP. 373, 452 (1975).
141. The scope excludes the copying of the container or package in which
B's product is placed for marketing purposes.
142. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 10.
143. Cf. Chesebrough Mfg. Co. v. Old Gold Chem. Co., 70 F.2d 383 (6th
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is taken neutrally and, without further facts, connotes neither legal-
ity nor illegality.
A. Trade Secrets
Generally, trade secret 144 law evolved to preclude breaches of
confidence and trust.14 5 A trade secret includes the knowledge of
secret, unpatented processes and formulae and such marketing aids
as customer lists.
1 46
Relief for use of a trade secret will generally be granted where
the secret is obtained by improper means. 1 47 The classic case occurs
when a legally protectable secret is disclosed by the inventor
to an employee, then in a position of confidence and trust, who
later uses it to the detriment of the inventor. 48 Other improper
means of obtaining a secret include theft, wiretapping and aerial
reconnaissance.
1 49
Use of a trade secret is allowed however, if the knowledge is
placed in the public domain' 50 or if it is discovered "by fair and
Cir. 1934) (if general impression made by offending article, when seen
alone, upon eye of ordinary purchaser or user, is such as is likely
to lead him to believe it is the original article, there is unlawful "simu-
lation" amounting to "unfair competition").
144. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
(excellent discussion of trade secrets).
145. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 869
(1st Cir. 1966) ("In general, the essence of the wrong is the obtaining
of unjust enrichment and unfair competitive advantage through in-
equitable conduct, usually a breach of confidence."); Arnold, supra
note 10, at 430. See also E. KiTCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 368
n.1; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939); Henkle & Joyce
Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 572, 239 N.W. 772, 775-
76 (1976); Securities Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 171 Neb. 701, 702,
107 N.W.2d 540, 542 (1961).
146. Perfume formulas represent a classic trade secret formula. See Smith
v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). Compare California Intel-
ligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303
(1948), with Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198,
246 P.2d 11 (1952) (consumer lists).
147. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(a) (1939).
148. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Wexler v. Green-
berg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
149. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971) (aerial reconaissance). See
also Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for Statutory Solu-
tion, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1971).
150. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953); A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1935).
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honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclo-
sure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with
the known product and working backward to divine the process." 151
The primary advantage of relying on trade secret law to protect
a formula or process is (1) a process not satisfying the requirements
for statutory methods of protection can still be protected,1 52 and
(2) the protection is for an unlimited time, as long as the secret
is maintained and not discovered by allowable methods.153  While
trade secret protection does offer some advantages, the protection
is short of the monopoly conferred by a patent.
B. Copyright Protection
Common law copyright gave the author of literary work the
exclusive right to copy the work until he allowed general publica-
tion. 5 4 Statutory copyrights created new rights by allowing the
copyright holder to multiply or control multiplication of copies of
the work, even after general publication. 55 Legislatures, through
the copyright acts, sought to protect the economic rights of au-
thors.' 56 Designs of useful articles, as opposed to writings, were
generally not protectable by copyright, but were instead relegated
to design patent protection. 157 However, in 1954 Mazer v. Stein'5
extended copyright protection to a work of art incorporated into
a useful article. 59 Thus the Copyright Act' 60 allows statutory pro-
tection of a design. 6 '
Under existing law, the registration of an object's design, such
151. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
152. Discoveries lacking the standard of novelty needed to obtain patent
protection may still be protected. See, e.g., Franke v. Wiltschek, 209
F.2d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 1953).
153. This was one of the major objections expressed by Justice Douglas
in his dissenting opinion to Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 496 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. See, e.g., Sell, supra note 49, at 489.
155. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909); Jewel-
er's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 94 (2d Cir.
1922); 2 H. Nims, supra note 54, at § 272.
156. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976);
1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 110.2 (1976).
157. HOUSE COmm. ON JUDICIARY, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsION S. 22,
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5663 [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
158. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
159. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 700-06.
160. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 216 (1970).
161. See generally Comment, Trade Regulation: Legal Protection of Com-
mercial Design, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 652, 659-61.
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as the statuette in Mazer, comes under the provisions allowing
registration of "works of art."162 A more difficult issue is whether
works of art are constitutionally entitled to protection under the
copyright clause which provides Congress may pass laws conferring
"for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their...
Writings.' 163  Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion in Mazer
joined by Justice Black, would have put the case down for reargu-
ment to decide the question.'6 4  The issue may now be academic
since in Goldstein, the Court noted, "[t]hese terms [authors and
writings] have not been construed in their narrow literal sense but,
rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of con-
stitutional principles."' 6
5
The United States copyright office regulations provide that,
"[i] n order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody
some creative authorship in its delineation or form."' 16 Thus
works of art must show both creativity and originality to be pro-
tected; however, these subjective concepts make concrete definition
difficult. 16 7 Generally most commercial designs are not regarded
as susceptible to copyright protection. 168
The advantages of obtaining a copyright on a product design are
few. A copyright may be preferable to a trade secret since, pre-
sumably, once a product is placed on the market, trade secret pro-
tection ends.' 69 Further, the current copyright duration of twenty-
eight years with renewal for another like period 70 would be pre-
ferable to the fourteen year maximum protection available under
design patent laws.' 7 ' However, the copyright protection is of a
162. 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1970).
163. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (emphasis added).
164. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 219-21 (Douglas, J., concurring). The cur-
rent law covers "all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
The Copyright Revision Bill recently enacted by Congress gives pro-
tection to "original works of authorship." Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541. The change was an attempt
to avoid the constitutional problem- See REPORT, supra note 157, at
51, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5664.
165. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at 561.
166. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1976).
167. See generally 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 156, at §§ 10.2, 19.2.
168. Comment, supra note 161, at 660. See also E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN,
supra note 6, at 709 n.4 ("Can the shape of a product ... be protected
by copyright? The accepted answer . . . is no."). But see Treece,
supra note 80, at 86 n.39 ("The suggestion that the Stiffel pole lamp
might have been eligible for copyright protection is not too extreme
169. See section VI A supra.
170. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
171. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1970).
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limited nature. Only copying is prohibited, 1 7 2 whereas patent
grants a monopoly to the first innovator who meets the patent
registration requirements. Independent duplication of the design
by another is not protected under a copyright, but is protected
under a design patent.173 The desirability of a design patent over
a copyright may change with the new copyright period (author's
life plus fifty years) embodied in the copyright revision bill.1 74
Legislation for article design protection may yet develop. Title
II of the Copyright Revision Bill, 175 as passed by the Senate, in-
cluded limited protection for the designs of useful articles, regard-
less of whether the design itself could qualify as a work of art.
Because of several unresolved issues, including whether Title II
would create a new, unjustified monopoly, the House Committee
on the Judiciary *deleted Title II from the bill before committing
it to the Committee of the Whole House.176
The new act does, however, settle the federal preemption issue
as to copyrights. Section 301(a) makes federal law the exclusive
governing copyright law as of January 1, 1978.177
The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights
172. Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility: Copyright
or Design Patent?, 66 HARV. L. RV. 877, 884-85 (1953); see also Wolff,
Copyright Law and Patent Law: A Comparison, 27 IowA L. REV. 250
(1942).
173. See Pogue, Borderland-Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet,
52 Ui. L. Rzv. 33 (1953).
174. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541. A
design patent and a copyright may both protect the same object; how-
ever the Copyright Office as a matter of policy will not register any
design which is the subject of an issued design patent. 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.10(b) (1976). See also Comment, supra note 161, at 661.
175. S.22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
176. See REPORT, supra note 157, at 50, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5663.
177. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301 (a), 90 Stat. 2541. But
there are some exceptions. Section 301 (c) appears to codify the result
reached in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), until February
15, 2047. Section 301(b) clarifies Sears and Compco by referring to
certain actions which will remain with the states to enforce.
[Section 301(b)] sets out, in broad terms and without neces-
sarily being exhaustive, some of the principal areas of protec-
tion that preemption would not prevent the States from pro-
tecting. Its purpose is to make clear, consistent with the 1964
Supreme Court decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiff el
Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) that preemption does not extend
to causes of action, or subject matter outside the scope of
the revised Federal copyright statute.
REPORT, supra note 157, at 131.
116 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent
to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of
the Federal copyright law. The declaration of this principle in sec-
tion 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivo-
cal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinter-
pretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act pre-
emptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline
areas between State and Federal protection. 178
C. Design Patents
Patents give the holder the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling a patented invention. A patent may issue on a
design of an article of manufacture 179 that is not hidden or obscured
in normal use. 8 0 The Design Patent Act seeks to encourage the
decorative arts and enhance the aesthetic appeal and salability of
manufactured articles.1 8 1 While the act represents a commendable
attempt to provide statutory protection of commercial designs, the
difficulty in obtaining and keeping a design patent has perhaps
served as a catalyst for increased judicial protection of product con-
figurations and trade dress. 82 The act requires the design to be
"new, original and ornamental."' 83  But these statutory require-
ments have been recast, to reflect decisional law, into four require-
ments. The design must be: (1) new, (2) original, (3) ornamental,
and (4) show the exercise of inventive faculty.' 4
The requirement that the design be new means the design, to
the average observer, must be novel and more than the mere modi-
fication of an existing design. 8 5 Originality requires the inventor
178. REPORT, supra note 157, at 130. "[Tihe concept of publication [will]
lose its all-embracing importance . . . ." Id. at 129. For an excellent
discussion of the problem, see Comment, Publication and the Copy-
right Law Revision, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 672 (1962).
179. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
180. Application of Cornwall, 230 F.2d 457, 459 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
181. Mott, The Standard of Ornamentality in the United States Design Pat-
ent Law (pt. 1), 48 A.B.A.J. 548, 548 (1962).
182. Note, Unfair Competition Protection After Sears and Compco, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 101 (1965). See also Pogue, supra note 173, at 36-
38; Comment, The Impact of Sears and Compco on Federal Trademark
and Patent Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 91, 93 (1969). As to the difficulty
in keeping a design patent valid, see Note, supra note 50, at 545-46;
Amerock Corp. v. Aubrey Hardware Mfg., Inc., 275 F.2d 346, 349 n.1
(7th Cir. 1960).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
184. See R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956);
Sel-O-Rak Corp. v. Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp., 232 F.2d
176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956); Comment, supra note
161, at 656; Comment, supra note 182, at 93 n.24.
185. Metallic Indus., Inc. v. Brauning, 279 F. 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1922); Appli-
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to make a design different and superior to one which a person
skilled in the art might have made; thus, more than routine skill
is necessary.'8 6 Both the newness and originality requirements tie
in with the fourth requirement, i.e., the design must be sufficiently
new and original to show the exercise of inventive faculty.181 Thus
the patentability inquiry may be framed as whether the design is
patentably new and original in that it represents a non-obvious ad-
vance over the prior art. 8 This has been regarded as a rigorous
test and has resulted in a high failure rate in attempts to secure
design patents. 89
The third requirement of ornamentality involves considerations
separate from inventiveness. Functional or utilitarian designs are
not patentable; however, if the design is distinguishable from the
utilitarian functions, it may be patented. 90 Where the subjective
aesthetic aspects of ornamentality are at issue,19' the courts have
tested the requirement in terms of "rudimentary aesthetic ap-
peal" 92 or "graceful and pleasing."
193
While obtaining and retaining a design patent may be difficult,
protection against infringement of a valid patent is broader than
most other statutory protection.'9 4  But, since the design patent
cation of Abrams, 205 F.2d 202, 203 (C.C.P.A. 1953); Cf. United States
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (novelty, nonobviousness and utility
are tests of patentability). See also W. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DE-
SIGNS § 46 et seq. (1929).
186. Trojan Textile Corp. v. Crown Fabrics Corp., 143 F. Supp. 48, 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
187. S. Dresner & Son, Inc. v. Doppelt, 120 F.2d 50, 51 (7th Cir. 1941);
Comment, supra note 161, at 656; Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4,
at 952 n.75.
188. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
189. See, e.g., Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion);
Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trauling Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 419
(2d Cir. 1952); Comment, supra note 161, at 657 & n.35. Cf. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1964) (in order
to deal fairly with and effectively guard the rights and welfare of
the community, prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly ob-
served, "lest in the constant demand for new appliances the heavy
hand of tribute be laid on each slight technological advance.")
190. E. KiTcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 709 n.7; Mott, The Standard
of Ornamentality in the United States Design Patent Law (pt. 2) 48
A.B.A.J. 643, 644-45 (1961).
191. Mott, supra note 181, at 551-52; Comment, supra note 161, at 656-
57.
192. H.C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son, 20 F.2d 311, 312 (2d
Cir. 1927).
193. See, e.g., Harris & Schafer, Inc. v. Curtiss Aerocar Co., 69 F.2d 264,
266 (5th Cir. 1934) (design patent on automobile trailer held valid).
194. Comment, supra note 182, at 127; Law & Junkins, Registrability of
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acts have proved unsatisfactory in protecting commercial designs,
further legislation, such as that proposed but not enacted in the
recent copyright revision bill,195 may be warranted.
D. Trademarks
Trademark protection, as it exists today, is both statutory and
common law, both state and federal. A trademark is a device by
which a manufacturer identifies his goods and distinguishes them
from the goods of another manufacturer. 9 The functions of a
trademark include identifying the manufacturer, guaranteeing the
quality of the goods, and advertising the product. 97 Behind these
functions is an even broader purpose of preventing consumer decep-
tion as to the source of the product. 98 Common law trademarks
arise through adoption of the mark and its use in the market
place.199 Exclusive use of a trademark at common law was based
on priority of appropriation and was limited geographically to the
Packages and Configuration of Goods on the Supplemental Regis-
ter: Design Patent vs. Trademark Registration, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 22,
33-35 (1955).
195. See Comment, supra note 161, at 662; REPORT, supra note 157, at 50.
Title II of S.22, the basic bill for the recently enacted copyright revi-
sion bill, dealt with design protection. The Committee deleted Title
II, in part because it could not truly be classified as copyright protec-
tion and therefore was outside the scope of copyright revision. See
REPORT, supra note 157, at 50, and text accompanying note 176 supra.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). For other definitions see Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) ("A
trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser
to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he
wants."); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)("[The trademark function is to] identify the origin or ownership of
the article to which it is affixed.").
197. DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); 3 R. CALLmAN, THE LAW
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOIES, § 65 (3d ed.
1969); E. KITCH AND H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 409 n.1; Diamond,
The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 265,
289-90 (1975); Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function
of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 75, 78 (1974);
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813, 814 (1927).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970); Ladas, supra note 6, at 252; Comment, supra
note 182, at 94.
199. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 493 F.2d 275, 284 (8th
Cir. 1974); Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1967);
E. KrrCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 412-13; Lunsford, supra note
197, at 77.
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area where it had become established by use.20 0  Although state
statutes provide trademark protection,2 01 the Federal Trademark
Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act) 20 2 is the most important, since it
covers trademarks used in interstate commerce.20 3  Generally,
registration under the Lanham Act confers only procedural advan-
tages, and no greater substantive .rights than exist at common
law. 20 4
Registration under the Lanham Act may be either in a principal
or supplemental register. A mark may be registered on the princi-
pal register if it has "become distinctive of the applicant's goods." 20 5
Entry on the principal register allows the owner to prevent regis-
tration of similar or infringing marks,20 6 obtain damages and in-
junctive relief for infringement, 20 7 prevent importation of items
with infringing marks,20 8 use the registration in court as prima
facie evidence of rights,20 9 and, after five years, to have an incon-
testable mark.210
Registration on the supplemental register is simpler, since the
applicant need only show the mark's capability of distinguishing
his goods or services. 211 The owner of a mark on the supplemental
200. Griesedieck W. Brewery Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d 1019,
1022 (8th Cir. 1945).
201. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-111 to 125 (Reissue 1976).
202. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 to 1127 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Lanham
Act].
203. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 412-18 (brief history).
While the patent acts are based on the patent clause of the Constitu-
tion, the Lanham Act is based on the commerce clause; therefore the
mark must be used in interstate commerce before it can be registered.
Derenberg, The Twenty-seventh Year of Administration of the Lan-
ham Trademark Act of 1946, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 339, 444 (1974); Com-
ment, supra note 182, at 93.
204. Brown & Bigelow v. B-B Pen Co., 191 F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1951).
Cf. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369 (1924) (no new right
created from omnipresent possibility of fraud).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f) (1970). The trademark must either have attained
secondary meaning by actual operation as an indicator of the product
source or it must be inherently distinctive. See Note, supra note 50,
at 542.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970).
207. Id. §§ 1114, 1116-17, 1121.
208. Id. § 1124.
209. Id. §§ 1057(b), 1115 (a).
210. Id. §§ 1065, 1115(b). See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc.,
531 F.2d 366, 371-77 (7th Cir. 1976). But see E. KiTCH & H. PEmRMAN,
supra note 6, at 464-68 (defensive-offensive distinction).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970).
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register can only prevent the registration of confusing marks212 and
obtain damages and injunctive relief.213  The purpose of the sup-
plemental register is to allow American manufacturers to obtain
certain registration rights in foreign countries, although their
marks do not qualify for the broader protection afforded by the
principal register.214
The Lanham Act provides for registration on the supplemental
register of "any ... configuration of goods ... capable of dis-
tinguishing the applicant's goods. '2 15 This provision was at one
time narrowly construed to exclude items covered by design patents
and registration of configurations of the entire good-although con-
figurations which were part of the good could be registered. 216
Eventually both limitations gave way.21 7 Early cases holding that
a configuration registered on the supplemental register could not
be advanced to the principal register even if secondary meaning
was established 218 also gave way and advancement to the principal
register was eventually allowed.219
Functional or utilitarian designs 220 may not be registered since
to do so would allow the registration owner "to obtain a monopoly
on an unpatentable device by registering it as a trade-mark. '221
This concept was extended in Application of Deister Concentrator
Co.,222 to exclude registration of functional product configurations
which identify the product's source, that is, have acquired a sec-
212. Id. § 1052(d).
213. Id. §§ 1114, 1116-17.
214. See Note, supra note 50, at 543-44.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970). No trademark rights attached at common
law to shapes of goods. Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4
(5th Cir. 1950); Zelnick, Registrations of Configurations of Goods and
Containers in the Light of the Sears and Compco Decisions, 55 TRADE-
MARK REP. 933, 937 (1965).
216. Note, Registrability of Packages and Configuration of Goods on the
Supplemental Register: Design Patent v. Trade-mark Registration, 23
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 82 (1954).
217. Application of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A.
1964) (registration of the article's overall configuration); In re Pepsi-
Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (1959) (design patent not a bar).
218. See, e.g., Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
74 (1952) (registration on principal register denied).
219. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958) ("Pinch"
Scotch bottle). See also In re Duro-Test Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
137 (1962); Note, supra note 50, at 544 n.27.
220. See "functionality" discussion section VI G infra. See generally S.
OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, 142-43 (2d ed. 1965); Zelnick,
supra note 215.
221. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957).
222. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
PRODUCT SIMULATION
ondary meaning.223 The functionality limitation was reaffirmed in
In re Honeywell, Inc. 224
In Application of Mogen David Wine Corp.,225 the court indi-
cated that nonfunctional container configurations could be regis-
tered on the principal register if secondary meaning was shown.
An earlier opinion in the registration of the Pinch scotch bottle
had not considered functionality; 22 6 therefore the court's holding
was significant. The Mogen David decision came three days after
the Sears and Compco decisions. A motion for rehearing in light
of those decisions was denied.227 Registration of the Mogen David
bottle was eventually rejected because secondary meaning could not
be shown.228 Judge Smith, in a concurring opinion, addressed the
Sears and Compco decisions and distinguished them on the grounds
that they dealt with conflicts between federal patent law and state
unfair competition law and did not involve trademarks.229 Judge
Smith noted the purpose of the federal design patent law was to
encourage ornamental design, whereas the purpose of federal trade-
mark law was to promote free use of words not serving as trade-
marks and to protect the public from confusion, mistake, and
deception.230
In Application of Shenango Ceramics, Inc.,23 1 the applicant
sought to register a product of configuration formerly protected by
a utility patent which had expired. Registration was denied since
the court found the utility patent to be adequate evidence of func-
tionality.232
E. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act 233 allows a civil cause of action
against one who "shall ... use in connection with any goods ...
a false designation of origin . . . and shall cause such goods ...
223. See Note, supra note 50, at 546.
224. 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
225. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The bottle was covered by an existing
design patent.
226. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958).
227. The broad dicta in Compco suggested that nonfunctional designs which
had acquired secondary meaning would not be entitled to trademark
registration. See Zelnick, supra note 215.
228. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
229. Id. at 542-43 (Smith, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 543.
231. 362 F.2d 287 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
232. Id. at 291.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Section 43(a)].
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to enter into commerce. '234  Although courts initially read this
section narrowly,' 35 subsequent interpretations beginning with
L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,236 have expanded its
scope into a federal unfair competition law.237 Generally, a prima
facie case under section 43 (a) involves a material, false representa-
tion of goods by the defendant which deceives the public to the
injury of the complaining competitor.238
With this expansion, the copying of a competitor's goods has
been held actionable under section 43(a) .239 Some authors believe
Sears and Compco negate section 43(a)'s applicablity to copying of
a competitor's goods,240 but this has not yet happened. In Middle-
town Mfg. Co. v. Super Sagless Corp.,241 the defendant bought
some of plaintiff's slider recliner hardware and used that hardware
in a product which defendant represented to be its own. The court,
citing Sears and Compco, said defendant had "the legal right to
copy the design and sell hardware almost identical to that sold by
[plaintiff] ,"2'42 but noted the hardware used was not a copy but the
234. Id.
235. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 6, at 48 n.1.
236. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). See also Potato Chip Inst. v. General
Mills, Inc., 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
237. Under section 43 (a), federal substantive law has been held to control,
even if a state court is hearing the case. Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co.,
389 F.2d 264, 268 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968); Brown & Bigelow v. Remembrance
Advertising Prod., Inc., 279 App. Div. 410, 412, 110 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444
(1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 909, 110 N.E.2d 736 (1953). See generally 4
R. CALLMAN, supra note 197, § 93.1 (b).
238. See Weil, Protectibility of Trademark Values Against False Competi-
tive Advertising, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 527, 537 (1956).
239. Zandelin v. Maxwell Bently Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Catalina, Inc. v. Gem Swimwear, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958). Cf. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d
405 (6th Cir. 1963) (packages and containers); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961)
(trade dress).
240. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND.
L.J. 84, 101 (1973). This analysis apparently assumes adequate label-
ing by the copier to designate source, a situation explicitly found in
both Sears and Compco, at least as to the packages. Another author
indicated that while Sears and Compco had wiped out common law
passing off, it could be reinstated under section 43(a), although to
do so would be "dubious in view of the language and purpose of
that system." The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 86, at 311.
The latter view as to the effect of Sears and Compco appears overly
broad in light of more recent interpretations of those cases.
241. 382 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Miss. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1975).
242. Id. at 982.
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actual product of the plaintiff. The defendant misrepresented it to
be his own and section 43 (a) relief was granted.
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.2 43 extended section 43 (a)
further. Plaintiffs, an entertainment group known as "Monty
Python," claimed ABC's editing of their original taped work so
mutilated the performance as to violate section 43(a). Plaintiffs
charged the edited work was represented as theirs, which, while
technically true, created a false impression of origin. The final
product was actually the creation of ABC's editors and censors, the
plaintiffs said. Plaintiffs relied solely on their common law copy-
right on the script and their rights as authors.2 44 Limited relief
was granted, with Judge Gurfein speculating in a concurring
opinion that the court's decision represented the first application
of section 43 (a) to a common law copyright case.245
This extension of section 43(a), while commendable as an at-
tempt to bring uniformity to unfair competition law, does present
some significant concerns. Since the Lanham Act gives very little
definitional substance to the section, relief under section 43(a) is
through court interpretation. This is really no different than the
development of common law unfair competition, except section
43(a) allows another basis for federal jurisdiction. Since common
law unfair competition balances the public interest in competition
and the private producer's interests in his products, the basic policy
favoring competition which is embodied in common law unfair com-
petition will not be disturbed,2 4 if the courts, in construing section
43(a), recognize the policy balance. But problems will arise if a
court ignores the common law balance and instead injects concepts
of business morality into its decision.247
F. Unfair Competition and "Passing Off"
Unfair competition has been used to describe a wide variety of
business torts.248 In the area of product simulation law, however,
the copying of a competitor's product is not, of itself, actionable.249
But, a product's originator is protected in the general configuration
243. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
244. Id. at 26.
245. Id. (Gurfein, J., concurring).
246. See discussion section VI F & G infra.
247. See discussion of Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d
1210 (8th Cir. 1976), section VII infra.
248. Trade libel, malicious interference with contractual relations, bribes,
espionage, and price cutting. See generally Stem & Hoffman, supra
note 4; Handler, supra note 10.
249. Donald v. Uarco Business Forms, 478 F.2d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1973).
124 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
or appearance of his product against a competitor who enters the
field with a product sufficiently similar as to deceive the public
and palm off or misrepresent his goods as those of the originator. 2"
The basis of the action is not the copying itself, but rather the act
of palming off so as to deceive the purchaser.2 51
Copying is also prohibited in instances where the product
configuration has come to be associated by purchasers with a par-
ticular manufacturer as the source. This association is generally
referred to as secondary meaning and is limited to instances where
the configuration sought to be protected is nonfunctional. 25 2 Func-
tional features may be freely copied, since to hold otherwise would
create the equivalent of a perpetual common law monopoly or
patent..2 53 The thrust of the secondary meaning limitation is still
to prohibit passing off, since if the public associates the configura-
tion with a particular manufacturer, the copying of that configura-
tion will mislead the purchaser. Thus the classic definition of un-
fair competition is that it "consists in palming off one person's goods
as the goods of another." 25 4 Early cases discussed fraudulent in-
tent,2 55 but the trend has been to look not at intent but at the com-
mercial result of the act.256 The presence or absence of intent may
be important, however, in influencing a court's attitude in a case,257
250. Cf. Comment, supra note 161, at 653 (the commercial designer is not
adequately protected by the existing legal structure). See also Seven
Up Co. v. Cheer Up Sales Co., 148 F.2d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 1945); J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir.
1941); Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284, 287
(8th Cir. 1928); Personal Finance Co. v. Personal Loan Serv., 133 Neb.
373, 377-78, 275 N.W. 324, 327 (1937).
251. See Comment, supra note 161, at 653.
252. Id. at 653-55.
253. Treece, supra note 80, at 90-91.
254. Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir.
1928). One author restated the rule: "The copying of [1] nonfunc-
tional features of an article which [2] have acquired a secondary
meaning, with [3] a resulting confusion as to source or origin, consti-
tutes unfair competition and will be enjoined by the courts. This
is the majority rule reduced to its simplest formula." Pollack, supra
note 48, at 76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
255. See, e.g., Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S.
665 (1901); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
256. Compare Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284, 288
(8th Cir. 1928), with Kann v. Diamond Steel Co., 89 F. 706, 712-13
(8th Cir. 1898) (intent irrelevant). The Kann rationale has generally
been regarded as that followed by the majority of courts both in the
United States and in England. See 2 H. Nims, supra note 54, § 350.
257. See Neely v. Boland Mfg. Co., 274 F.2d 195, 203 (8th Cir. 1960); El
Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1954); White
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in creating a presumption,2 58 and in shifting the burden of proof.259
Trademark law and unfair competition law overlap to some ex-
tent, and one court observed:
The inquiry under the registered trade-mark is whether there has
been a colorable imitation of it upon goods of the same class as
those to which it has been appropriated, while under the law of
unfair competition the inquiry is whether by any kind of imitation
the purchaser is misled in buying goods of one manufacturer for
those of another.260
This same court later held unfair competition resulted even where
the imitation was in a noncompetitive field, if the imitator was in
fact trading on the originator's reputation and goodwill.261
Perhaps a better distinction was made earlier by the same court:
"[S] uits ... [for trademark infringement] rest on the ownership of
the trade-marks. Suits . . . [for unfair competition] are founded
upon the damage ... [caused] by the fraudulent passing of the
goods of one manufacturer for those of another."2 62
While distinctions between trademark law and unfair competi-
tion have been made, they may well be meaningless.
The proper function of a trademark is that by association with
goods it becomes a means of identification of the origin or owner-
ship of the article and hence a symbol of good will. This essential
element is the same both on trade-mark cases and in cases of unfair
competition unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement. The
law of trade-marks is but a part of the law of unfair competition.263
G. Unfair Competition and "Secondary Meaning" and "Functionality"
Secondary meaning is a trademark concept that has filtered into
Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d
67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937),'cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937); RESTATEMNT
OF TORTS § 729, Comment f (1938); 10 UTAH L. REv. 726, 730 n.23
(1966).
258. Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 419 (8th Cir. 1943);Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir.
1928); RESTATEMNT OF TORTS § 729, Comment f (1938).
259. Treece, Protectibility of Product Differentiation: Is and Ought Com-
pared, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1047 (1964).
260. F.W. Fitch Co. v. Camille, Inc., 106 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1939), citing
J. HoPKINs, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENA1ES AND UNFAIR COM-
PETrION § 22 (4th ed. 1924).
261. Hanson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 163 F.2d 74, 78 (8th Cir. 1947).
262. Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 F. 821, 826 (8th Cir. 1901).
263. Seven Up Co. v. Cheer Up Sales Co., 148 F.2d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 1945).
See also Hanover Star Milling Co, v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13
(1916).
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the broader unfair competition law.26 4 As with the passing off con-
cept, free copying is allowed, but with the exception that copying
is not allowed when the ordinary purchaser has come to identify
the product configuration, or trademark, with a particular manu-
facturer.265 Although secondary meaning protection and passing
off are similar, there is a subtle distinction. Passing off recognizes
no protectable interest in the object or configuration, rather it
limits use of the copy. Secondary meaning recognizes as protect-
able an interest in the object or configuration itself.266 If an item
has acquired secondary meaning, copying may be enjoined or clear
differentiation as to source required.2 7 Thus, generally, the solu-
tion for both passing off and secondary meaning lies in explicit
source identification, usually by labeling the product with the name
of the manufacturer and any other necessary disclaimers.
The purpose of the secondary meaning rule is to prevent pur-
chaser confusion. This is known as the "likelihood of confusion"
standard,268 under which confusion among ordinary purchasers in
the relevant market as to the source of the goods is actionable. 269
The test refers to ordinary purchasers and not careless ones.2 7 0
264. Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888,
911 (1964); Comment, supra note 161, at 655.
265. Comment, supra note 161, at 653; 1 H. NIMs, supra note 54, § 36.
266. Comment, supra note 161, at 653.
267. Id. at 653-54.
268. 10 UTAH L. REV., supra note 257 at 731.
269. See Treece, supra note 80, at 93.
270. Seven Up Co. v. Cheer Up Sales Co., 148 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1945);
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938). One
particularly bad case where this concept was not maintained was
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coul-
tre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
832 (1955). There the competitor copied the clock face and external
appearance of the "Atmos" clock. The "Atmos" clock operated solely
by a mechanism sensitive to changes in pressure and temperature.
The competitor, while copying the external appearance, installed an
electric motor in its clock. The price difference was $135; however,
palming off was not an issue in the case since the competitor's name
was on the front of the clock and the electric cord visible in the rear.
The Second Circuit enjoined the copying, due to the competitor's intent
and likelihood of confusion among visitors to a purchaser's home who
would think the clock was the more expensive "Atmos" brand instead
of the competitor's cheaper electric model. The opinion by Judge
Frank was surprising since he generally favored free competition.
See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945)
(concurring opinion). The mistaken part of the rationale was confus-
ing visitors in the home with ordinary purchasers in the market. The
two are not the same, and by misapplying the test the court appeared
to be preventing a form of social climbing. "[The] wrong thus con-
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Generally, only a likelihood of confusion need be shown,2 7' not
actual confusion, although some would hold otherwise.27 2
To prove likelihood of confusion, secondary meaning must be
established.2 7 3 Since secondary meaning is source association, proof
of likelihood of confusion as to source, not of the products them-
selves, must be shown.27 4  One leading case required not only
source association but source motivation, i.e., the consumer pur-
chased the goods because of their source. 275 This source motivation
test has had a mixed reception 27 6 and is perhaps better modified
as requiring that the consumer care about the source.27 7
Secondary meaning arises from usage: 278
The criteria set forth for the establishment of secondary mean-
ing are simply stated as a combination of elements such as long
sisted of the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume that
the clock was an Atmos clock." 221 F.2d at 466. See Stern & Hoff-
man, supra note 4, at 944-47.
271. Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir.
1928); Pollack, supra note 48, at 81-82.
272. Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416, 422
(2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion). Cf. American-Marietta Co. v.
Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1960) (a showing that copied
features may have contributed to the confusion is not enough).
273. Note, supra note 21, at 838.
274. Id. at 848; cf. Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19
Ill. App. 3d 299, 309, 311 N.E.2d 386, 395 (1974) (form alone of manu-
facturer's display package was not the salient feature with which pro-
spective customers would identify batteries sold as emanating from
particular source). See also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beef-
eater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976): "[T]he test is not whether
the public would confuse the marks, but whether the viewer of an
accused mark would be likely to associate the product or service with
which it is connected with the source of products or services with
which an earlier mark is connected." Id. at 275 (emphasis in original).
275. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir.
1917) (opinion by Learned Hand, J.).
276. See generally Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra
note 264, at 912-14.
277. See Treece, supra note 259, at 1040. There is an interpretation of
a line of cases which results in what is known as the "Rushmore
Doctrine," which generally is taken as stating that relief will be
granted upon a showing of a likelihood of confusion, even without
a showing of secondary meaning. See, e.g., 3 R. CALrmA, supra note
197, § 77.4. This doctrine has been questioned on the ground that
secondary meaning in the products in question was so obvious that
the courts recognized it but did not deem it necessary to discuss it,
instead moving directly to the issue of a likelihood of confusion. See
Pollack, supra note 48, at 86.
278. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); 10 UTAH L. R.v., supra note
257, at 731 n.27.
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term usage, considerable effort and expenditure by the producer
toward developing a reputation and good will for the trademark,
resulting in the conscious connection in the minds of the general
public of that trademark to the producer of the product.279
Time is clearly an important aspect, especially in product configura-
tion cases; 28 0 however, there is no set time for establishment of
secondary meaning.281
Absent factors which give rise to presumptions or shift the
burden of proof, a plaintiff must prove secondary meaning. Meet-
ing this burden has been approached in a number of ways,2 82 with
consumer surveys in the market representing the general trend.2 83
The secondary meaning rule is subject to the functionality
doctrine, 28 4 a major limitation which prevents gaining a perpetual
property right in a product design without meeting the strict re-
quirements of procuring a patent or copyright.28 -" The rule is that
functional features in otherwise unprotected articles may be freely
copied. 28 6  Simulation of nonfunctional features which have ac-
quired secondary meaning remains generally prohibited.28 7 Func-
tionality, however, is an elusive concept. While it generally means
usefulness, functionality is often broadly defined.28 8  A reasonably
279. Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299,
308, 311 N.E.2d 386, 393-94 (1974). See also Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976). In Filter Dynamics,
the court found no secondary meaning based upon the size of the
replacement battery market, the relative amounts of sales and expendi-
tures and the length of time plaintiff's battery package had been on
the market (seven months).
280. "[I]t is difficult to adduce a secondary meaning to the contour of
a container or package. Nevertheless, there are shapes and forms of
containers and packages which are so unique or distinctive that
through long utilization they become associated with a particular
product." Note, supra note 182, at 125 (citations omitted, emphasis
added).
281. See Nies, Secondary Meaning: An Historical Note, 64 TRADEMARK REP.
247 (1974).
282. See generally Treece, supra note 259, at 1040.
283. Id. at 1038. See also Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531
F.2d 366, 385-88 (7th Cir. 1976) (detailed discussion of survey).
284. Like secondary meaning, the functionality doctrine is also derived
from trademark law. Generally, trademark rights are not granted
in functional items. See generally Application of Honeywell, Inc., 497
F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Note, supra note 50, at 546-50.
285. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 964 (2d
Cir. 1918); Arnold, supra note 10, at 432.
286. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 48, at 76.
287. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 839-40.
288. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938) (commer-
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workable definition is: "Functional features include those which
contribute to efficiency or economy in manufacture and handling
through the marketing process, and those which contribute to the
product's ... utility, durability or effectiveness or to the ease with
which it serves its function or is handled by users.
'289
Functionality in product configurations is a probLem. 290  While
Diester's rhomboidal table served a useful purpose, the functional-
ity of other designs may not be so obvious. If these designs are
in fact patentable, originators, by claiming the designs are nonfunc-
tional, can seek a common law property right without meeting the
standards of patent law. To prevent this, some courts have relied
.on a concept of aesthetic functionality, 29 1 which allows copying of
a larger number of product features.
29 2
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,293 is probably the leading case
on aesthetic functionality. The court in Pagliero held design
features on a china plate enhanced its saleability and were there-
fore functional.294 And, in J.C. Penny Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile
Co.,29 5 the court found a bib overall pocket design had commercial
cially essential features as functional); Lektro-Shave Corp. v. General
Shaver Corp., 92 F.2d 435, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1937) (manufacturing sense
of functionality-essential to construction); Ainsworth v. Gill Glass
& Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183, 186-87 (E.D. Pa. 1938), affd, 106 F.2d
491 (3d Cir. 1939) ("When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic
value, their features may be functional because they . . . contribute
to the value . . . ."); Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery,
Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 311, 311 N.E.2d 386, 396 (1974) ("Functional
in this sense means any purpose other than . . . identification of the
source of the goods"); Note, supra note 21, at 839 ("[F]eatures which
enhance the competitive nature of the product [are functional] and
those features which possess only ornamental or design characteristics
[are non-functional].") See Pollack, supra note 48, at 77; Develop-
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note 264, at 918; Note,
Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLuM. L.
RaV. 544 (1964).
289. Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Astron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299,
311-12, 311 N.E.2d 386, 396 (1974); Developments in the Law-Com-
petitive Torts, supra note 264, at 909; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742,
Comment a (1938).
290. Comment, supra note 58, at 398.
291. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742, Comment a (1938): "When goods are
bought largely for their aesthetic value, their features may be func-
tional because they definitely contribute to that value and thus aid
the performance of an object for which the goods are intended." See
also Note, supra note 50, at 549.
292. Note, supra note 21, at 840; Note, supra note 288, at 566-67.
293. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
294. Id. at 344. See Note, supra note 50, at 549.
295. 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941).
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appeal and was, therefore, functional. Design patent applications
had been refused twice. "[A witness' testimony that the useful
features could have been incorporated into a different design] did
not involve a consideration of the functional elements inhering in
the unity and properties of the structure or in the legitimate desire
of the public for the design itself. '' 296  One author found an
aesthetic functionality argument in the Sears and Compco opinions;
however, there is no direct support in the cases for this idea.297
Not all courts have favored aesthetic functionality. 298 Probably
the most important decision rejecting the argument was Application
of Mogen David Wine Corp.299 Although a trademark registration
case, the decision bears on unfair competition law because trade-
mark law and unfair competition operate on the same concepts.
The argument, phrased in terms of "functionality in ornamenta-
tion," was termed by the court "ingenious," but was rejected as
having no support in the case law. 300
Shortly after Mogen David, the same court heard a case involv-
ing configuration, not of a container, but of a product itself in Ap-
plication of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. 30 1  The significance
normally attached to Minnesota Mining is that the court decided
a product's configuration could be registered on the supplemental
and principal registers under the Lanham Act. However, the court
implied the shape would not be registerable if "it was adopted pri-
marily to be ornamental, or to make the goods easier to pack or
to use or to make, or even more saleable."30 2 Judge Rich, writing
for the majority, recognized that to some extent, aesthetic function-
ality could be important when the product's shape itself was the
subject of registration.
Another recent case suggests acceptability of aesthetic function-
ality in trademark registration cases. In re Honeywell, Inc., 30 3 dealt
with the application for trademark registration of Honeywell's
round thermostat cover. The examiner refused registration on the
296. Id. at 954 (emphasis added).
297. See Note, supra note 21, at 848 n.85 (aesthetic functionality indicated
by pole lamp's market success).
298. See, e.g., Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261,
271 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
299. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
300. Id. at 931, 932-33.
301. 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
302. Id. at 840.
303. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 576 (1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
For an earlier disposition of the case, see 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619
(1971), remanded, 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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ground that the distinctive features claimed as a trademark were
dictated by the thermostat's shape and "are either primarily func-
tional or ornamental in nature."3 0 4 The Board cited the Restate-
ment of Torts,30 5 which sets forth the aesthetic functionality idea,
along with other aspects of functionality. 308 Although not ground-
ing its decision entirely on aesthetic functionality, the Board noted:
The fact that both the cover and the thermostat are round does
not detract from the functional characteristics thereof. In fact, it
may add to the utilitarian aspects. There are only so many basic
shapes in which a thermostat or its cover can be made ... namely,
squares, rectangles, or "rounds" . . . . The fact that thermostat
covers may be produced in other forms ... does not and cannot
detract from the functional character of the configuration here in-
volved.307
On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals cited the
above language favorably and affirmed, although aesthetic func-
tionality was not explicitly discussed in the opinion.3 0 8
The secondary meaning-functionality concepts are one side of
a balance between public interest in competition and producers' in-
terests. The functionality rule allows free imitation of utilitarian
configurations, thereby preventing common law monopolies. The
secondary meaning rule requires public injury in the form of a like-
lihood of source confusion for relief.30 9 On the other side, common
law passing off and the Lanham Act protect producers' interests
by preventing misrepresentation and by requiring the imitator to
identify his goods.
Recently, secondary meaning restrictions have been attacked or
ignored.3 10  Failure to utilize this concept lessens consideration of
public interest in competition and free copying and leads to deci-
sions based on the court's ideas of business morality. This approach
tends to favor anti-competitive producer interests. Protection of
both producer and consumer is better realized by a requirement
of clear source identification, and labeling is the logical method of
achieving this.8 1 ' Instances where labeling or disclaimers by label-
304. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 577.
305. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 747, Comment a (1938).
306. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 579.
307. Id.
308. Application of Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
309. Note, supra note 21, at 841.
310. See Note, supra note 182, at 105.
311. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964)
(dicta); American Rolex Watch Corp. v. Ricoh Time Corp., 491 F.2d
877, 879 (2d Cir. 1974) (marks appear similar from a distance but
are distinguishable close up); Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Lab, Inc.,
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ing are insufficient protection should be rare. 3
12
H. Misappropriation
Protection of product configurations by the misappropriation
doctrine should be applied only as an equitable remedy of last
resort where protection is unjustifiably not available by other
means. 313 A prima facie misappropriation case exists where a de-
fendant, at little cost to himself, uses something which cost the
plaintiff-originator something to develop, and the use diverts profits
from the plaintiff.314 Although the public's interest as well as pri-
vate interests could be balanced in each case, it frequently is not.
315
Since equitable principles are involved, application of the misappro-
priation doctrine is done on a case by case basis to allow
examination of business facts and circumstances. 316
Even without the misappropriation doctrine, the means to pro-
tect product configurations are extensive. Absent statutory protec-
tion of the configuration, palming off or misrepresentation of the
purchaser can be prevented by either common law unfair competi-
tion or the Lanham Act.
The instances where these protections are not enough should be
rare. The very use of the misappropriation doctrine may even sug-
467 F.2d 304, 310 (2d Cir. 1972); Venn v. Goedert, 319 F.2d 812, 816
(8th Cir. 1963); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d
949, 956 (8th Cir. 1941). See generally Treece, Copying Methods of
Product Differentiation: Fair or Unfair Competition?, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 244 (1963); Treece, supra note 259.
For an interesting variation, see Filter Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. As-
tron Battery, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 299, 311 N.E.2d 386 (1974), where
the plaintiff allowed private labels to be placed on the package which
was the object of the litigation. The court said, "A plaintiff who
would enjoin others from imitation under trademark and unfair com-
petition laws should not himself be guilty of misrepresenting the
source of his own article." Id. at 310, 311 N.E.2d at 395.
312. But see Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975) (disclaimer notice on
package insufficient).
313. Sell, supra note 49, at 487; Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine
after Sears-Compco, 2 U.S.F.L. REV. 292, 305 (1968); 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv., supra note 51, at 168.
314. J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10.25 (1973);
Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note 264, at 932;
8 U.S.F.L. REv., supra note 20, at 201.
315. Note, supra note 21, at 842; Comment, supra note 313, at 299 n.27.
316. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 49, 69 (1969); Sell, supra note 49, at 483; Comment,
The Misappropriation Doctrine:-- A Search for Literary Title Protec-
tion, 12 SANTA CLARA LAw. 142, 144 n.20 (1972).
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gest a failure to consider fully the events which lead to the alleged
wrongful acts.3 1 7 The best reason for limiting the doctrine, how-
ever, is its causation of decisional uncertainty and favoring of
private interests of manufacturers over the more important public
interest in competition.3 1 8
VII. TRUCK EQUIPMENT SERVICE CO. v. FRUEHAUF CORP.:
PRECEDENT AND POLICY IGNORED
As discussed above, overriding the various product configuration
protections are the broad policy issues of free competition and de-
cisional certainty. These protections and concepts will be used to
analyze a recent eighth circuit product simulation case, Truck
Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corporation,3 19 to determine (1)
if the court addressed the free competition issue; (2) if product
simulation doctrines were properly applied; (3) what is the present
status of Sears and Compco in the eighth circuit; (4) whether prior
eighth circuit precedents were followed; and (5) whether the case
facilitates future private ordering of affairs.
A. Facts
Truck Equipment Service Company 320 manufactured a twin hop-
per bottom grain trailer which it first sold in interstate commerce in
1968.321 No sales staff covered the company's thirteen-state market
area; instead word-of-mouth advertising and occasional advertising
in a trade periodical and a Nebraska newspaper of general circula-
tion constituted TESCO'S promotional effort.32 2 Most sales were in
Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota. The external design of the trailer,
which was designated the "Cornhusker 800," viewed from the side
looked like this:
323
317. See note 54 supra.
318. See, e.g., Note, supra note 50.
319. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 164 (1976).
320. Hereinafter referred to as TESCO.
321. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, slip op.
at 1 (D. Neb. April 20, 1973).
322. Id. at 1-2.
323. 536 F.2d at 1217.
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The exterior of the Cornhusker 800 is trapezoidal in appearance.
The front and rear panels of the trailer slope from the top of each
panel outward to the bottom of each panel. This feature has been
described throughout the proceedings as the sloping-end walls of
the trailer. The lower rail of the side panels presents to the eye
a broken line; it is not parallel with and equidistant from the
ground level at all points. Rather it extends above the rear wheels,
parallel with the ground, then slopes down and extends for several
feet, in a line parallel with the ground, below the top of the rear
wheels, then slopes up again at the front landing gears to extend
in a line parallel with the ground and on the same plane as the
line above the rear wheels. This feature has been described
throughout the proceedings as the drop-center-side wall.3 24
As to the design, the district court found:
The sloping end panels and the design of the side panels are the
prime distinctive features of appearance of the trailer. . . . The
exterior design of the Cornhusker 800 is dictated in part by con-
struction efficiency and in part by appearance. The exterior design
is distinctive and unique and is used by [TESCO] to identify its
• . . trailer and to distinguish it from those manufactured by com-
peting manufacturers. 325
The trailer design was not protected by patent or copyright. 326
Defendant Fruehauf is a leading semi-trailer manufacturer.3 2'
Fruehauf considered entering into an arrangement with TESCO
whereby Fruehauf would purchase trailers and market them; how-
ever, TESCO rejected Fruehauf's offer.32 8  In August, 1970, Frue-
hauf purchased a Cornhusker 800 trailer, removed TESCO's iden-
tifying labels, replaced them with labels and other gear indicating
it was manufactured by Fruehauf's "Hobbs" division, and photo-
graphed the trailer.3 29 Certain of these photographs were distrib-
uted to Fruehauf personnel and distributors in November, 1970,
along with a letter stating the exterior design added strength and
gave "the trailer its own identification." 330 In December, 1970, cer-
tain of these photographs were placed in sales literature and distrib-
uted.3 31 Also in December, 1970, Fruehauf manufactured its first
drop-center-sloping-side-wall twin hopper bottom grain trailer
which it labeled as a "Hobbs" trailer. The exterior appearance of
324. Id. at 1216-17.
325. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, slip op.
at 2.
326. Id. at 5.
327. 536 F.2d at 1213.
328. Slip op. at 2-3.
329. Id. at 2.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 3.
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the "Hobbs" trailer was identical to the exterior design of the Corn-
husker 800.332
TESCO filed suit in January, 1972,3 3 3 alleging that use of the
photographs of its Cornhusker 800 trailer in Fruehauf's advertising
and that copying the exterior design of its trailer constituted un-
fair competition, both in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.334 No state law issues were raised, only federal section 43 (a)
violations. The district court bifurcated the trial and considered
liability and damages separately.335
In discovery, TESCO admitted it never attempted to obtain
patents336 on the trailer nor had it registered a trademark for the
trailer.337
B. District Court Decision on Liability
The district court recognized that no liability would lie for copy-
ing the trailer design unless there was palming off or the trailer
design had acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace.338
TESCO conceded Fruehauf had not palmed off its trailer339 and that
issue was not present in the case. 340
TESCO argued that the configuration of its Cornhusker 800 had
acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace. 341  The court
noted Sears and Compco "held that any person may copy and place
into commerce an unpatented or uncopyrighted product. ' 342 How-
ever, the court went on to discuss the functionality aspect of
332. Id.
333. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114 (D. Neb.,
filed Jan. 20, 1972) (complaint).
334. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970); Slip op. at 1. The court found liability
for use of the photographs and this finding was affirmed on appeal.
536 F.2d at 1215-16. The use by a defendant of a photograph of plain-
tiff's product in defendant's advertising is not within the scope of this
comment. See generally cases cited in the circuit court's opinion and
Hill, Liability Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for Advertise-
ments Featuring a Photographic Reproduction of a Competitor's Prod-
uct, 64 TRADEmARK REP. 226 (1974).
335. 536 F.2d at 1217 n.9.
336. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, at 8 (D.
Neb., filed August 16, 1972) (Answers to Interrogatories Set I).
337. Id. at 9; Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114,
at 3 (D. Neb., filed August 21, 1972) (Answers to Interrogatories Set
II).
338. Slip op. at 5.
339. Id. at 6; 536 F.2d at 1214 n.2.
340. See section VI F supra.
341. See section VI G supra.
342. Slip op. at i n.2.
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secondary meaning.343 The court did not mention the following
Compco dicta:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made
in some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not es-
sential to the use of either article, that the configuration of the
article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies the
maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among pur-
chasers as to which article is which or as to who is the maker, may
be relevant evidence in applying a State's law requiring such pre-
cautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the copier's mo-
tives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for im-
posing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and
selling.3 4 1
Although the Compco language appears to prevent a copying
prohibition based on the secondary meaning-nonfunctionality rule,
the district court instead cited Prosser to support the limitation.3 45
Fruehauf's engineers had, in evaluating the Cornhusker 800
design, concluded that the sloping end walls were essentially useless
from an engineering standpoint 346 and recommended the end walls
be redesigned or some use be made of the dead space.3 47 The dis-
trict court relied heavily on this evaluation and on the testimony
by TESCO's president that the design was intended to have a dis-
tinctive appearance.3 48 In discussing functionality, the court ap-
peared to concentrate primarily on the sloping end walls although
the drop center side walls were also mentioned.349 The court con-
cluded that "portions of the Cornhusker 800 trailer exterior design
are nonfunctional. 3 50
Having found nonfunctionality, the court proceeded to what it
considered to be the second element of secondary meaning-
"whether the unique design of the plaintiff's trailer indicates the
origin of the trailer."35 1 This is not entirely correct, since the
proper test is whether the ordinary consumer in the market place
had come to identify the product with its source, i.e., had the hypo-
thetical consumer come to identify the configuration of the Corn-
husker 800 with TESCO,3 5 2 with a resulting likelihood of confusion
343. Id. at 6 & i n.2.
344. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)
(emphasis added).
345. Slip op. at i n.2.
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id. at 6.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See section VI G supra.
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as to the source of Fruehauf's trailer.353  For evidence of source
association, the court stated: "As previously noted, several custom-
ers of the plaintiff identified the trailer pictured on the defendant's
sales literature as being a Cornhusker 800. This suggests that the
design of the hopper trailer was identified with the plaintiff."
54
This evidence of confusion appears to have come solely from tes-
timony of TESCO employees and its president and from a Fruehauf
employee.355 Neither the district nor appellate court opinion indi-
cated consumer research had been conducted. 3 56 Moreover, it ap-
pears the district court inferred secondary meaning from Frue-
hauf's actions, relieving TESCO of its burden of proof:
Moreover, inferences can be drawn from the evidence that the
design of the plaintiff's trailer had acquired customer identification.
The evidence shows that the defendant did not manufacture a
hopper bottomed trailer prior to 1970; that there were different
types of hopper trailers which the defendant could have copied;
that the Cornhusker 800 had a unique design; and that the defend-
ant copied the most distinctively designed hopper trailer, even when
the defendant's engineering staff indicated that portions of the de-
sign were useless. It might reasonably be said that the act of the
defendant in adopting the design of the Cornhusker 800 indicated
that it expected confusion as to origin and expected to profit from
the consumer acceptance of the plaintiff's trailer.3 57
The district court failed to discuss the public's interest in copy-
ing and that interest's favored position; with certain qualifications,
in our legal system. Nor did the district or circuit court discuss
indications that, prior to the trial on the liability issue, Fruehauf
sold its trailer for slightly less than TESCO's retail price. Free
copying of the TESCO design probably would have benefited the
general public because of Fruehauf's larger market area and its
sales staff. Fruehauf's trailer was of at least equal quality 358 and
if the purchasing public desired that type of grain trailer, (as
TESCO's and Fruehauf's sales would appear to indicate they
353. Id. See also Slip op. at i n.3.
354. Slip op. at 6 (emphasis added).
355. 536 F.2d at 1220.
356. See text accompanying note 283 supra.
357. Slip op. at 6. The court of appeals noted, "The District Court relied
upon, in addition to the direct testimony, the inference of secondary
meaning which arose from the fact that Fruehauf copied the exterior
design of the TESCO trailer exactly without attempting to determine
whether any portions thereof were nonfunctional." 536 F.2d at 1220
n.13.
358. "The Fruehauf trailer was not inferior in quality to the Cornhusker
800. .. ." 536 F.2d at 1214 n.2.
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did), that public's desire would have been accommodated, since
TESCO's market area was limited to three primary states.3 59
Additionally, the court failed to consider aesthetic functionality
or to require direct evidence of consumer source identification,
rather than second-hand opinions of consumer reactions.
There was no discussion of TESCO's limited advertising to de-
velop consumer identification, 360 or of the short span of time
between TESCO's production of the trailer in 1968 and Fruehauf's
in 1970. Both factors argue against establishment of secondary
meaning.
As to consumer confusion, the court considered the photographs
used by Fruehauf and the resulting "suggestion" of consumer iden-
tification. This type of confusion was irrelevant since the proper
test is confusion of the ordinary consumer as to the source of the
product. 361 In its secondary meaning inquiry the district court
also appeared to have looked at the product itself to determine con-
sumer confusion, instead of at source confusion. Since the trailers
made by Fruehauf were adequately labeled and a semi-trailer is
not likely to be the subject of a casual purchase due to cost, prob-
able experience of the purchaser, financing lead time, and desire
for specific features, the likelihood of source confusion should have
been examined more closely than is indicated by the court's opinion.
The district court found Fruehauf liable and issued an injunction
prohibiting Fruehauf's manufacture of twin hopper bottom grain
trailers with an exterior appearance similar to the Cornhusker
800.362 The injunction was limited to TESCO's thirteen state
market area.36 3 The court's memorandum opinion accompanying
the injunction did not discuss the monopoly and -common law
patent aspects of enjoining the copying of the trailer configura-
tion.364
C. Subsequent Developments and the Decision on Damages
Subsequent to the liability finding and injunction, Fruehauf
359. Slip op. at 1-2.
360. See text accompanying note 279 supra.
361. See section VI G supra.
362. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114 (D. Neb.,
June 14, 1973) (injunction).
363. Id. This is consistent with trademark law that a trademark is estab-
lished by use and limited to the geographical area of use. See text
accompanying note 200 supra.
364. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114 (D.
Neb., June 14, 1973) (memorandum on application for injunction).
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uncovered additional evidence as to trailer designs. Timpte, Inc.
manufactured a trailer prior to TESCO's which had sloping end
walls but a straight frame.365 Its side view would appear as such:
Wilson Trailer Co. also manufactured a grain trailer of similar con-
figuration prior to TESCO's Cornhusker 800.366 TESCO responded:
"The sloping ends are not the distinguishing features of the Corn-
husker 800, the drop sides are, and everyone knows it."13 6 7
Fruehauf then introduced evidence that Spencer-Stafford Load-
craft, Inc., in conjunction with the V.I. Moser Co., manufactured
a hopper bottom grain trailer prior to the Cornhusker 800 which,
while having straight end walls, did have a drop center side wall.366
On application by Fruehauf, the district court amended the in-
junction "to authorize manufacturing and selling by the defendant
of trailers identical in appearance to the plaintiff's Cornhusker 800,
if the defendant marks, advertises and sells its trailers as its own
and refrains from using photographs and other representations of
the plaintiff's Cornhusker 800 in its advertisements." 3 69 Addition-
ally the district court found no damages for Fruehauf's use of the
photograph of TESCO's trailer in the Fruehauf sales literature. As
for the copying of the design, the district court reaffirmed its prior
finding of liability, and held Fruehauf liable for twenty percent
of profits earned on trailer sales within TESCO's primary three-
state sales area.37 0 As to amending the injunction, however, the
365. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, at 3 &
Exhibit 1-A (D. Neb., filed Jan. 24, 1975) (affidavit (accompanying
motion and notice of hearing)).
366. Id. at 4.
367. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, at 9 (D.
Neb., filed Jan. 28, 1975) (opposition to motion to reopen discovery).
368. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, at 10 (D.
Neb., filed Feb. 7, 1975) (affidavit).
369. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114 (D. Neb.,
April 28, 1975) (judgment and-order).
370. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114, at 1, 3-4(D. Neb., April 28, 1975) (memorandum on amount of recovery).
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court appears not to have relied on the new evidence of prior
trailer designs.
Considering the number of Cornhusker 800s which have been
manufactured by the plaintiff since the plaintiff began its manu-
facturing operation up to the present time and the number of copies
made and sold by the defendant, it is probable that it no longer
can be said that the consuming public identifies the distinctive de-
sign of the Cornhusker 800 with the plaintiff. The defendant has
requested that the injunction be modified to authorize manufactur-
ing and selling copies of the plaintiff's Cornhusker 800 so long as
the defendant marks, advertises and sells its trailers as its own and
refrains from using photographs or other representations of the
plaintiff's Cornhusker 800 in its advertisements. That will be
done.371
TESCO appealed the relief granted and Fruehauf appealed the
finding of liability. The injunction and its subsequent modification
were not appealed.
3 72
For comparison, a recent case decided by the district court for
Nebraska also considered a section 43(a) issue. In Delano Granite,
Inc. v. Mid-America Granite Industries, Inc.,3 7 3 defendant sold
copies of plaintiff's tombstones. The court found no section 43 (a)
liability, noting:
This case factually differs from Truck Equipment Service Com-
pany v Fruehauf Corporation, [536] F.2d [1210] (C.A. 8th Cir. June
9, 1976). In that case I found that use of a photograph of a trailer
traded upon the reputation of a trailer manufacturer and confused
potential customers as to the source of origin of the trailer pictured
on the sales literature. Such is simply not true in the present case.
It was also held in the Truck Equipment case that copying of the
exterior design of the trailer was a trademark infringement, be-
cause the uniqueness of that exterior design had gained a secondary
meaning indicating the origin of the trailer. Factually, that is not
true in the present case, because neither the trademark symbol nor
any design of any monument or marker had acquired such familiar-
ity in the Kansas-Nebraska area to indicate to customers the origin
of the monument or marker.3 74
The Mid-America Granite plaintiffs also alleged trade secret vio-
lation, interference with contract, palming off, etc. At the close of
the opinion the court stated:
In considering all the counts in the complaint I have kept in
mind International News Service v. The Associated Press ...
which has been ... emphasized .... It is true that in that case
the court underscored the relationship of competitor vis-a-vis com-
371. Id. at 4.
372. 536 F.2d at 1213-14.
373. No. CV75-L-154 (D. Neb., June 25, 1976).
374. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
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petitor, of reaping where one has not sown, and of being entitled
to the beneficial use of property for which one has fairly paid the
price. But that concept, for all its majesty, draws no lines and of-
fers no explanation for later cases such as Sears, Roebuck & Com-
pany v. Stiffel Company... and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc .... It is not that the latter cases emasculated Interna-
tional News; it is rather that they have drawn lines to offer guid-
ance in identifying applicable realms of the reap-where-they-have-
not-sown generality of International News.3 75
D. The Eighth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, the eighth circuit dealt first with Fruehauf's broad
attack that "[t] he public interest in having competitive sources of
identical utilitarian products makes copying privileged, even though
the original incorporates nonfunctional features and has acquired
a secondary meaning, when the copier clearly labels its product as
its own and is not guilty of palming off."37 6  This attack relied
on Sears and, primarily, Compco. 377 The court rejected the perti-
nent parts of the Compco opinion as dicta, since trademark law was
not an issue before the Sears and Compco court. "The issue before
the [Compco] Court was whether state law could extend the effec-
tive term of patent protection granted by the federal statutes."3 78
The court distinguished patent-copyright and trademark law, say-
ing each protected a different interest,379 as had the court in Appli-
cation of Mogen David Wine Corp.3 0
The TESCO court also distinguished its opinion in J.C. Penny
Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 381 on the ground the Penny court
found the design to be functional and without secondary meaning.382-
Penny is generally regarded as a leading aesthetic functionality
case because it held that to "require defendant to make some change
in the style of the design. . . would deprive it of part of its com-
petitive appeal."38 3 Further, the Penny court had indicated that
375. Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
376. 536 F.2d at 1214. Portions of the opinion dealt with section 43(a) and
the use of a photograph of a competitor's product in advertising. These
considerations are beyond the scope of this comment.
377. Fruehauf relied upon and the court rejected the language from
Compco in text accompanying note 344 supra.
378. 536 F.2d at 1214. This does not appear to conflict with Hampton v.
Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967), where the court, relying
on Sears and Compco, held that the duplication or copying of un-
patented implement equipment could not be permanently enjoined.
379. 536 F.2d at 1215.
380. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). See text accompanying note 225 supra.
381. 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941). See text accompanying note 295 supra.
382. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d at 1214 n.3.
383. J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d at 956.
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"[a] design, for example, may not be utilitarian in a technical
sense, but it may nevertheless be functional in the sense that it
will contribute materially to a general sale of the goods. '384
In addition to functionality, Penny addressed the consumer
confusion issue. The court did not specifically find the design to
be without secondary meaning, as the TESCO court implied, but
instead noted:
Under all the facts of the situation, we hold that the form and
content of the labels in this case and the manner in which they
were displayed on the garment, together with the fact that the
overalls were sold only in defendant's own stores, afforded the pub-
lic such explanation and notice as it was reasonably and practi-
cably necessary and possible to place upon the garments, as a pro-
tection against probable deception and confusion in source
identification.38 5
In relying on aesthetic functionality and on the adequacy of the
labels to identify the product, the Penny court had as a basic
premise that
[design imitation] is one of the privileges of our system of compe-
titive enterprise. It insures to the public the benefit of all natural,
useful progress in the industrial and commercial arts. Any article,
structure or design, which is unpatented, may accordingly be
imitated or appropriated in its functional aspects, if no unfair com-
petition is involved in the manner of its use.386
In rejecting Sears and Compco, the TESCO court appears to have
rejected the formulation of aesthetic functionality earlier set forth
in Penny. The Penny court clearly felt the public interest in being
able to acquire bib overalls with a popular pocket design out-
weighed the producer's interest in restricting competition in the de-
sign. This important balancing of consumer desire versus competi-
tive interests was not made in TESCO.
Additionally, in adopting the Mogen David distinction between
patent and trademark law, the eighth circuit failed to address an
important issue:
[A] possible conflict with Sears and Compco will arise only when
an entire product configuration or a distinctive part, as distin-
guished from its package or container, is registered as a trademark.
While a distinctive bottle or container may acquire trademark sig-
nificance for the enclosed product, it generally, if not always,
remains free for use by producers of unrelated products. Trade-
384. Id. at 954.
385. Id. at 956-57. Cf. Bowdil Co. v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 216 F.2d
156, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1954) (drill bits).
386. 120 F.2d at 953-54.
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mark registration of the product, however, results in a theoretically
perpetual monopoly of a configuration that Sears and Compco seem
to assign to the public domain in the absence of a valid design
patent.38 7
After rejecting Fruehauf's broad attack, the TESCO court pro-
ceeded to review the narrower attack on the district court's findings
of fact as to secondary meaning, functionality, and likelihood of con-
fusion.
In reviewing the district court's finding of nonfunctionality, the
court relied primarily on Fruehauf's engineers' report that the slop-
ing end walls were useless and on testimony by TESCO's president
that the design was intended to be distinctive and a selling point.
Additionally the court noted: "[T] he testimony of Fruehauf's man-
agement showed that the decision to manufacture a trailer identical
to the Cornhusker 800 was based on sales rather than engineering
considerations." 388 This reaction of management would appear con-
sistent with the purpose of free competition as embodied in product
simulation law. Part of the problem on the functionality issue was
the apparent failure of Fruehauf's witnesses to agree whether the
shape was necessary to the interior construction of the twin hopper
bottoms and the general strength of the trailer.38 9 TESCO's evi-
dence as to alternative methods of construction was apparently not
refuted in the first trial on liability. 90 The eighth circuit there-
fore concluded the district court was not clearly in error for finding
portions of the exterior design nonfunctional. Again, in the discus-
sion of the narrower attack, the aesthetic functionality concept was
ignored.
The nonfunctionality finding itself could not prevent copying,
since the object must have acquired secondary meaning with a like-
lihood of consumer confusion. The court rejected the testimony
that other grain trailers had either sloping end walls or drop center
side walls, stating: "It is the overall design which the District
Court found to be distinctive and possessed of a secondary mean-
ing."391 The problem with this finding, other than conflict with
Sears and Compco, was its lack of basis in evidence. 392 The court
admitted it was relevant to proof of secondary meaning that rela-
tively few trailers had been sold by TESCO and that its advertising
was not extensive; 393 however, as had the district court, the eighth
387. Comment, supra note 182, at 97 (citations omitted).
388. 536 F.2d at 1218.. Compare with note 297 supra.
389. Id. at 1219 n.10.
390. Id. at 1218 n.10, 1219 n.11.
391. Id. at 1217 n.9.
392. See section VII B supra.
393. 536 F.2d at 1220.
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circuit relied upon the testimony of TESCO and Fruehauf employ-
ees as to consumer confusion; and that, as noted before, is not the
correct evidence upon which to focus the secondary meaning in-
quiry.394 The court's review of the finding of a likelihood of confu-
sion was again grounded upon the testimony of the employees. The
court stated that "given the intent of Fruehauf to trade upon the
reputation of TESCO, the inference that a likelihood of confusion
would arise is inescapable. '" 395 Ultimately the court concluded:
Fruehauf, without knowledge of or inquiry into the functional and
nonfunctional aspects of the exterior design of the Cornhusker 800,
copied exactly not only the superior functional qualities of the
TESCO trailer but also the exterior physical characteristics by
which that good reputation was known to the purchasing public.
It not only sought and received the benefits of TESCO's goodwill,
but, by coupling the latter's reputation with its own well-known
name, set upon a course of conduct which, in practical effect, would
destroy the good reputation of TESCO.39 6
The district court's award of twenty percent of the profits from the
three state primary sales area was modified to all of the profits,
thus increasing the award from $30,070.21 to $144,550.41. 3 97
E. Implications of the Opinion
If the Sears and Compco opinions were cast in broad terms to
retard use of the misappropriation doctrine and to favor the private
producer's interests,398 TESCO is a reversion to pre-Sears and
Compco law. This is made evident by projecting the TESCO facts
upon the various available methods of design protection.
The design was not eligible for trade secret protection once
placed in the public domain, as it was then no longer a secret.399
Protection under the copyright act also was doubtful since it is diffi-
cult to conceptualize a grain trailer as a work of art, although this
is not a certainty.40 0 Even so, copyright protection would probably
have failed absent registration once the object was "published."
While sales to the public would probably have constituted publica-
tion, this too is uncertain in light of the failure of the copyright
394. See section VII B supra.
395. 536 F.2d at 1220.
396. Id. at 1223.
397. Compare Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114
(D. Neb., April 28, 1975) (judgment and order), with Truck Equip.
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., No. CV72-L-114 (D. Neb., July 16, 1976)
(amended judgment).
398. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
399. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
400. See note 168 supra.
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act to protect recordings and performances. 40 1 Under the newly
enacted copyright law, publication and common law copyright will
no longer be relevant,40 2 but the new law is no closer than the old
to offering clear design protection by copyright.40 3
Fruehauf's subsequent evidence of other trailers with sloping
end walls or drop center side walls precluded protection by design
* patent, had one been sought. The Cornhusker 800's design, combin-
ing the drop center side and the sloping end walls into the same
trailer, would not qualify as either new, original, or as an exercise
of inventive faculty. Nor would this combination be a design su-
perior to one which a person skilled in the art might have made.40 4
Finally, since Fruehaufs labeling of its trailer precluded palm-
ing off, the only remaining design protections were the trademark-
unfair competition protection, in the form of secondary meaning
with a likelihood of consumer confusion and the misappropriation
doctrine. These were, of course, the protections the district and
circuit courts allowed and, had the district court not modified the
injunction, TESCO would have been granted a perpetual common
law monopoly in the manufacture of grain trailers with the exterior
configuration consisting of sloping end walls and drop center walls.
This is the same sort of trespass against the balance between public
and private interests struck in the copyright and patent acts as that
committed by the seventh circuit in Sears and Compco 40 5 and re-
jected by the Supreme Court.
Both the injunction and damages in TESCO conflict with the
Compco admonition, whether dicta or not, that "neither these facts
nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or pro-
hibiting the actual acts of copying and selling."40 6
Additionally, the TESCO court not only affirmed support for
the International News Service misappropriation doctrine but
adopted its objectionable examination of private producers' inter-
ests to the exclusion of those of consumers.
[Fruehauf's] argument [as to the adequacy of labeling] is a refor-
mulation of the proposition that the law of unfair competition pro-
tects only against palming off or misrepresentation. The law of
unfair competition, however, protects also against misappropria-
tion. See International News Service v. Associated Press .... As
the Supreme Court has said:
401. See, e.g., note 117 supra.
402. See note 178 supra.
403. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
404. See section VI C supra.
405. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
406. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. at 238.
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The fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right
of the complainant as against the public, instead of considering
the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in busi-
ness, as between themselves. 407
The adoption of this test ignores the public's interest in free compe-
tition among manufacturers, an interest represented in litigation
only if the court conscientiously keeps that interest in mind. By
choosing the International News Service test, the eighth circuit has
foresaken the precedents of common law unfair competition which
carefully kept public interest as the primary focus. "Abandonment
of the 'public inquiry' requirement in these private trade regulation
suits would most unfortunately restrain those competitive forces
on whose action our economy is based, and would impair the per-
sonal freedom from state action to which our social order is
dedicated." 408
TESCO appears to reject, or at least further narrow, Sears and
Compco; to reject the aesthetic functionality approach of Penny;
and to adopt the misappropriation doctrine, not as a last equitable
resort but as a first line means of protecting product configuration.
As a result, along with the misappropriation doctrine will come
case-by-case decisions based on equitable considerations as be-
tween manufacturers, rather than on predictable principles of law
and free competition. Perhaps future cases will now result in more
opinions with such comments as follows:
We reach this conclusion by applying the same "eyeball" test
as that applied by the District Court. We do not say that six eyes
are necessarily apt to reach a more accurate assessment than are
two, but, under the standard of review applicable in this case, our
six eyes tell us that the color of the packages is similar.409
Thomas Holmes '77
407. 536 F.2d at 1220 (quoting from International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. at 239). See section VI H & section III supra.
408. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 971.
409. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927, 931 (8th
Cir. 1976). Cf. Saxony Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716
(9th Cir. 1975) (noses and "sniffing test by court").
